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Essay
Making the Teamsters Safe for Democracy
George Kannart
INTRODUCTION: CHANGING DRIVERS
Hollywood at last has cast its glamorizing gaze upon the Teamsters.' A
century after Homestead-long past the time when Sam Peckinpah and others
made the big screen safe for graphic violence-the bloody organizing struggles
of the modem labor movement have suddenly been deemed suitable for family
viewing. And yet, for all its size and influence, the International Brotherhood
of Teamsters2 was made to wait its turn. In terms of cinematic history, Don
Vito Corleone, who first appeared on screen more than twenty years ago, is
old enough to be the current Hoffa's godfather.
t Professor of Law, State University of New York at Buffalo. Thanks are owed to Dawn Baksh, Jean-
Christophe Agnew, Dianne Avery, Guyora Binder, Aviam Soifer, and especially to James B. Atleson and
Ellen V. Weissman. Indispensable research assistance was provided by Oren L. Zeve. The author served
as an uncompensated technical advisor to the new International Brotherhood of Teamsters administration
with respect to the Rules and Procedures of its Ethical Practices Committee. All analyses, opinions, and
conclusions expressed herein are strictly and exclusively the author's own, and they do not reflect the
views, opinions, attitudes, or conclusions of any other individual or entity.
1. HOFFA (Twentieth Century Fox 1992). The many distortions and inaccuracies contained in this
fictionalized, romanticized, and unavoidably heroic entertainment are detailed in Sean Wilentz, Tales of
Hoffa: A Movie's Shady Connections and Disconnections, NEWV REPUBLIC, Feb. 1, 1993, at 53. See also
A.H. Raskin, Was Jimmy Hoffa a Hood? Or Was He a Robin Hood?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 1992, at H9.
2. The full name of the union is the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs,
Warehousemen, and Helpers of America [hereinafter the Teamsters or IBT]. Founded in 1903, the union
had 1.6 million members in 1991, down from a 1978 high of 2.2 million. Its members work in a variety
of jobs and trades throughout the private sector; approximately 8% hold public-sector jobs. Bob Baker,
Teamsters Convene Under Gaze of Justice Department, L.A. TIMES, June 23, 1991, at Al, A27. The IBT
is the largest union in the United States and has "by far" the largest political action committee fund. Peter
Carlson, Teamster Glasnost, WASH. POST, Dec. 8, 1991 (Magazine), at W15, W17.
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Off the screen, of course, the netherworlds of these two different
characters have long overlapped. In 1987, one of The Godfather's plot lines
seemed almost to become a matter of judicial record, as Teamsters officials
and alleged members of organized crime were said to have been involved in
collaborating to corrupt gambling in Las Vegas.3 But prosecutors,4 journalists,
historians---and millions of rank-and-file Teamsters-had become aware of
this connection long before. So, indeed, had the entire American public, with
Robert Francis Kennedy serving as the national publicist-in-chief:6 by the
1980's, the union was "an icon of pop culture, like Elvis."7 During the past
four decades, the abuses of the Teamsters leadership were not only the target
of repeated investigations,8 but occasioned the enactment of major federal
labor legislation, most notably the Landrum-Griffin Act of 1959.9 For thirty
years, neither the law, nor all this attention, seemed to make much difference.
Repeated attacks on corrupt locals,'" innumerable criminal prosecutions of
3. See United States v. Cerone, 830 F.2d 938 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1006 (1988)
(scheme involving skimming from Las Vegas casinos allegedly purchased by alleged crime figures with
loan from Teamsters pension fund).
4. See infra text accompanying notes 10-13 (detailing previous prosecutorial efforts against Teamsters).
5. Books about the Teamsters' well-known history of corruption are legion. Among the leading ones
are STEVE BRILL, THE TEAMSTERS (1978); JAMES R. HOFFA, HOFFA: THE REAL STORY (1975); RALPH C.
JAMES & ESTELLE D. JAMES, HOFFA AND THE TEAMSTERS: A STUDY OF UNION POVER (1965); JAMES
NEFF, MOBBED UP: JACKIE PRESSER'S HIGH-WIRE LIFE IN THE TEAMSTERS, THE MAFIA, AND THE F.B.I.
(1989); WALTER SHERIDAN, THE FALL AND RISE OF JIMMY HOFFA (1972); ARTHUR A. SLOANE, HOFFA
(1991). The most authoritative and detailed account of the events surrounding the recent change in
Teamsters leadership is KENNETH C. CROWE, COLLISION: How THE RANK AND FILE TOOK BACK THE
TEAMSTERS (1993). Another extremely helpful account and analysis is Kirk Victor, In the Driver's Seat,
24 NAT'L J. 2423 (1992), which emphasizes the constraints imposed upon the "New Teamster" leaders by
the narrowness of their electoral victory and the continuing domination of the lower ranks of the union
bureaucracy by uncooperative, even hostile, holdover officials.
6. This role included service as a congressional investigator, FINAL REPORT OF THE SELECT
COMMITrEE ON IMPROPER ACTIVITIES IN THE LABOR OR MANAGEMENT FIELD, S. REP. No. 1139, 86th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1960) [hereinafter MCCLELLAN COMMITTEE REPORT]; as a best-selling author, ROBERT
F. KENNEDY, THE ENEMY WITHIN (1960); and as U.S. Attorney General. See VICTOR S. NAVASKY,
KENNEDY JUSTICE (1971) (recounting and detailing this celebrated "feud" and the Kennedy "Get Hoffa"
squad at the Justice Department); see generally ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., ROBERT KENNEDY AND HIS
TIMES (1978).
7. THOMAS GEOGHEGAN, WHICH SIDE ARE YOU ON? TRYING TO BE FOR LABOR WHEN IT Is FLAT
ON ITS BACK 137 (1991).
8. See, e.g., Plaintiff's Complaint at 104, United States v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 905 F.2d
610 (2d Cir. 1990) (No. 88 Civ. 4486) [hereinafter Complaint] (calling Teamsters "the union most
controlled by organized crime," which for decades "has exercised substantial influence over the
international union, primarily through the office of the president").
9. The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1988)
[hereinafter Landrum-Griffin]. The legislative history of the Act is replete with references to, denunciations
of, and calls for fundamental change within the Teamsters. See discussion infra Part M.
10. See, e.g., United States v. Local 560, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 780 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 476 U.S. 1140 (1986); United States v. Bonanno Organized Crime Family, 119 FR.D. 625
(E.D.N.Y. 1988), see also Michael J. Goldberg, Cleaning Labor's House: Institutional Reform Litigation
in the Labor Movement, 1989 DUKE L.J. 903, 965-74, 977-80 (1989) (discussing two previous RICO-based
efforts to clean up particular New York and New Jersey locals).
Professor Goldberg's exemplary and definitive article, completed before the events with which this
Essay is primarily concerned had taken place, and to which this Essay is heavily indebted, addresses many
of the issues discussed here, but in a more thorough and comprehensive manner. It displays a detailed and
encyclopedic appreciation of the relevant legal and labor history, and analyzes a wide variety of union
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suspect individuals," and even an attempt to transform the union
wholesale 2 all failed to alter the union's fundamentally lawless culture.
In 1988, however, the U.S. Department of Justice began the effort anew,
filing a massively publicized civil RICO case against the union, its leadership,
and a number of individuals alleged to be among the leading figures in
organized crime. The 113-page complaint commencing this unprecedented
action recounted at gruesome length the sordid and extremely violent
relationship between the mob and the union, charging that the union was a
large-scale racketeering enterprise.13 The objective of the suit, according to
the chief prosecutor, was "to take back the Teamsters from the Mafia,"'4 and
to eradicate the underworld influence that had long since become
disciplinary devices and Landrum-Griffin issues, as well as the pros and cons of using RICO to reform both
national and local unions. For obvious reasons, Professor Goldberg necessarily gives the IBT considerable
attention. Perhaps most valuably of all, Professor Goldberg also puts forward ten sensible and nuanced
"sentencing rules," responsive to the concerns discussed infra Part I, for the use of courts engaged in union
clean-up work. Id. at 1003-10. Professor Goldberg's extraordinary accomplishment follows in the
distinguished tradition established long ago by Professor Clyde Summers, who has also extensively
addressed many of the issues discussed in this Essay. See Clyde Summers, Union Trusteeships and Union
Democracy, 24 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 689 (1991) [hereinafter Summers, Union Trusteeships] (reviewing past,
largely disappointing experiences with insufficiently aggressive court-imposed trusteeships); Clyde
Summers, Democracy in a One-Party State: Perspectives from Landrum-Griffin, 43 MD. L. REv. 93 (1984)
[hereinafter Summers, Democracy] (emphasizing limitations of Landrum-Griffin when it comes to affording
genuine internal democracy).
I1. One close observer has estimated the number of previous successful prosecutions at approximately
340. GEOGHEGAN, supra note 7, at 156.
12. See Cunningham v. English, 175 F. Supp. 764 (D.D.C. 1958), aff'd, 265 F2d 379 (1959); see also
Goldberg, supra note 10, at 984-94 (describing nationwide, judicially imposed Board of Monitors designed
to supervise and reform Teamsters in late 1950's). According to Professor Goldberg, the 1959 passage of
Landrum-Griffin, which many thought made the Board's trusteeship superfluous, as well as possible "union-
busting rashness" on the part of the judge in response to the union's obstinacy, contributed to the failure,
and ultimately to the dissolution, of the Board in 1961. Goldberg, id., at 994.
13. This extraordinary and historic document details a series of at least twenty-two murders, as well
as a host of beatings, acts of intimidation, and other serious crimes, stretching back for decades, that were
allegedly committed in order to establish and maintain a relationship between the IBT and organized crime.
Complaint, supra note 8, at 40-76. Its caption also is noteworthy. In addition to the union's International
General President and the members of the union's International General Executive Board (as well as the
Teamsters union as an entity), the caption names "The Commission of La Cosa Nostra" and more than a
dozen other high-profile individuals with suspicious-sounding nicknames, which were also listed in the
caption. The consent decree settling the matter, however, was signed only by the Teamsters-official
defendants. Consent Decree at 29-31, United States v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 905 F.2d 610 (2d
Cir. 1990) (No. 88 Civ. 4486) [hereinafter Consent Decree]. One of the government's attorneys in the case
has subsequently explored other ways in which private parties might also invoke RICO against labor
unions. Randy M. Mastro et al., Private Plaintiffs' Use of Equitable Remedies Under the RICO Statute: A
Means to Reform Corrupted Labor Unions, 24 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 571 (1991). Although this article is
addressed to "honest members and officials of trade unions," id. at 646, it does not devote much attention
to explaining why RICO remedies (or the threat of them) might not also be helpful, at least as a tactical
device, to employers involved in labor disputes. But see Victoria T.G. Bassetti, Weeding RICO Out of
Garden Variety Labor Disputes, 92 CoLuM. L. REv. 103 (1992); Howard S. Simonoff & Theodore M.
Lieverman, The RICO-ization of Federal Labor Law: An Argument for Broad Preemption, 8 LAB. LAW.
335 (1992) (warning against consequences of employer use of RICO in labor disputes).
14. Frank Swoboda, U.S. Sues to Take Over Teamsters; Immediate Trusteeship Is Sought To Squeeze
Out Mob Influence, WASH. POST, June 29, 1988, at Al (quoting Rudolph Giuliani, U.S. Attorney for the
Southern District of New York).
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institutionalized within the union. 5 The old-guard Teamsters leadership
initially attracted strong outside support for its resistance to this government
attack from highly reputable sources, both within the labor movement' 6 and
without.' 7 But in March 1989, for reasons that still remain obscure, 8 the
old-guard leaders suddenly and completely surrendered to the government.
15. One newspaper reporter, noting that the origins of labor racketeering lay in the unions' efforts to
protect themselves from employer-instigated violence, summarized the conventional view of the Teamsters'
history as follows:
The Teamsters' relationship with organized crime and their reputation for violence is not
unique to organized labor. Government investigations have found smaller-scale problems in
some longshoreman, restaurant and laborers union locals. It was not unusual for unions to seek
out organized crime figures in the 1930s for defensive muscle against employer-sanctioned
violence.
The difference in the Teamsters . . . is that this symbiotic relationship became
institutionalized under Hoffa: The mob enjoyed access to pension fund loans and jobs, and the
Teamsters enjoyed access to the muscle needed to win a strike or force a contract on an
unwilling employer.
Baker, supra note 2, at A27.
16. Although the government's action probably struck most armchair Teamster-watchers as long
overdue, many inside the labor movement, including many who were no friends of the Teamster leadership,
saw this unprecedented lawsuit, filed by a national Administration widely perceived to be hostile to
organized labor, see GEOGHEGAN, supra note 7, at 232, 253 (describing Reagan Administration response
to the PATCO air traffic controllers' strike, which led to the demise of the union, as well as that
Administration's alleged policy of nonenforcement of basic labor laws), to be worrisome and dangerous.
For reasons based on fear as well as fraternal solidarity, the filing of the suit was consequently met with
outrage from inside organized labor: as soon as the suit was filed, AFL-CIO President Lane Kirkland
declared it "a clear abuse of the government's prosecutorial power" that "would undermine a free trade-
union movement" were it to succeed. Swoboda, supra note 14, at AI0. The Washington Post also reported
that rumors that such a suit might be filed were what had led the AFL-CIO to re-admit the long-expelled
Teamsters to AFL-CIO membership the preceding year, as a gesture of solidarity. See id. See also infra
text accompanying notes 141-50 (describing Teamsters' departure from AFL-CIO).
17. The fact that the IBT is the most generous labor union in the United States in its campaign
contributions may be of some relevance here. After Robert Kennedy's assaults on it, the Teamsters had
become a steadfastly Republican union, in fact, the only Republican union once PATCO was extinguished
(by a Republican White House) in 1981. See Hoffa v. Saxbe, 378 F. Supp. 1221 (D.D.C. 1974) (President
Nixon commutes Hoffa's sentence under Kennedy-instigated conviction). See BRILL, supra note 5, at 109
(describing Nixon on post-resignation golf outing with Frank Fitzsimmons); Swoboda, supra note 14, at
A10 (U.S. Attorney General Meese recuses himself from anti-Teamster RICO case because he had helped
secure Teamsters' endorsement for Reagan's presidential efforts). The leader of the congressional attack
against the Republican Justice Department's filing of this novel RICO action was the ranking Republican
on the Senate Labor Committee, Senator Orrin Hatch. Goldberg, supra note 10, at 1001 n.613; Swoboda,
supra note 14, at AI0 (reporting anti-Justice Department remarks of Senator Hatch on MacNeil-Lehrer
News Hour). Senator Hatch was far from alone, however. See Carlson, supra note 2, at W17 (four
Presidential candidates, from both parties, address Teamster rally protesting suit; 246 members of Congress
send letter of protest to Attorney General).
18. Not altogether obscure, however: the RICO complaint had requested that the old-guard leaders be
barred from all further involvement in the union and, perhaps even more disturbing, that they be forced to
"disgorge" their hefty pensions. Complaint, supra note 8, at 112. The consent decree, in contrast, preserved
the old guard's pension rights and allowed them to participate in the 1991 election, Consent Decree, supra
note 13, at 4, whose outcome they may have thought they could control. In addition, settling the suit meant
that the individual defendants would be spared what would surely have been a very expensive trial. CROWE,
supra note 5, at 103.
Ironically, therefore, the government may have done so well in its consent decree precisely by trading
upon the same high officer financial self-concern that had always been one of the union's biggest problems.
The old leaders' subsequent explanation for having entered the onerous consent decree was that they had
been given poor legal advice. See generally Bob Baker, Teamsters Discover the Ballot, L.A. TIMEs, Sept.
27, 1990, at Al; Harry Bernstein, Ends Justify Means in Teamster Purge, L.A. TIMES, July 2, 199 1, at D3;
Bruce D. Butterfield, The Trials of Billy McCarthy, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 26, 1990, at A3.
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They agreed to enter into a comprehensive consent decree ceding
decisionmaking power over many of the union's important internal matters to
a variety of court-appointed outside monitors. 9
Acting pursuant to the consent decree, in December 1991, the federal
government conducted and supervised a direct, secret-ballot rank-and-file
election for the union's International General President and International
General Executive Board-the first election of its kind in all of Teamsters
history. The winner of the three-way race for a five-year term in Hoffa's old
position of International General President was Ron Carey, the clear "outsider"
candidate in the race.20 The leader of a Long Island United Parcel Services
Local, nationally celebrated as being "squeaky clean"2' and unusually devoted
to the rank-and-file members' interests as far back as 1978,2 Carey had made
a name for himself within the union by challenging the old guard's routine
acceptance of concessionary contracts. 23 He was supported by the anti-
establishment dissidents of Teamsters for a Democratic Union, and a number
of that organization's leaders joined him in office as members of the union's
first democratically elected General Executive Board.24
Carey's victory seemed impressive; he drew forty-eight percent of the total
vote in the three-man race,' and the Carey slate swept all but one of the
General Executive Board's seats.26 But this seemingly sweeping victory may
have been less impressive than it appeared. Overall voter turnout was a
depressing twenty-eight percent.27 Pre-election polls suggested that almost a
quarter of the members were still too intimidated or cynical to vote, that only
19. Consent Decree, supra note 13. The provisions of the decree are described, in general terms, in
United States v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 905 F.2d 610, 613 (2d Cir. 1990).
20. See Robert Fitch, Revolution in the Teamsters, TIKKUN, Mar.-Apr. 1993, at 19, 21. Two other
candidates appear to have split the old-guard vote. Peter T. Kilbom, Carey Takes the Wheel, N.Y. TIMES,
June 21, 1992 (Magazine), at 26. A fourth potential candidate, labor attorney James P. Hoffa, the son of
the disappeared former General President, was not allowed to run because he had never worked "in the
craft" as Teamsters rules required. Baker, supra note 2, at A27.
21. Id., at A26.
22. In many ways, Carey plays the role of the solitary "Good Teamster" in Steven Brill's 1978 The
Teamsters, an entire chapter of which was devoted to his member-oriented activities as the head of his
local. BRILL, supra note 5, at 156-99, See also Bob Baker, Reforms Pose Tough Task for Teamsters Winner
Carey, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1991, at A18 (Carey a union hero for two decades because of his "altruistic,
tough-minded leadership" of isolated local); Fitch, supra note 20 (Carey's local had "best pensions, best
grievance procedures, and best wages in the industry"). But see Elizabeth Lesly, Teamster Chief Hit for
Delay of Cleanup, VASH. 'IMES, Aug. 21, 1992, at D1 (discussing 1988 corruption prosecution of second-
in-command at Carey's Long Island local); Frank Swoboda, The Teamsters' New Face, WASH. POST, June
23, 1991, at HI (Carey involved with a New York City Joint Council implicated in corruption, but still
carries "least baggage" among presidential candidates). See also Richard Behar, How Hoffa Haunts the
Teamsters, TIME, Dec. 21, 1992, at 60 (collecting further adverse information).
23. CROWE, supra note 5, at 135-36.
24. Indeed, Fitch, among others, attributes Carey's electoral success in large measure to the efforts and
support of the long-standing activist reform group Teamsters for a Democratic Union [hereinafter TDU],
numbering about 10,000 members, who had been openly resisting the old-guard leadership since the 1970's.
Fitch, supra note 20, at 21.
25. CROWE, supra note 5, at 259.
26. Id. at 287-88.
27. Id. at 259.
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sixty percent of likely voters knew that the office of General President would
be on the ballot, and that forty percent or more of the prospective voters were
unable to name a single candidate for General President.28 Thus, Carey's
victory, by itself, was hardly conclusive proof that the novel concept of
"Teamsters democracy" really had pierced the members' long-standing apathy
and alienation. Indeed, as the returns were further analyzed, the reformers'
victory came to seem, if anything, even more precarious: the voting not only
was low; it was heavily factionalized. Only the hardest-core supporters of each
of the three slates of candidates appeared to have cast ballots.29 Still, in many
labor quarters, the (possibly surprised) reaction was almost embarrassingly
ecstatic. Victor Reuther of the UAW called Carey's victory the "most
important event for the American labor movement since the rise of the CIO
over half a century ago."30 The following summer, U.S. Representative
Joseph P. Kennedy II-the son of the Teamsters' original nemesis-hailed
Carey by name before a national television audience, referring to Carey's
election as the long-delayed "fruition" of his father's work.3'
But the federal court charged with supervising the consent decree showed
few signs of sharing this otherwise widespread euphoria. The court's reticence
was well-founded, for not only may Carey's own hold on power be somewhat
fragile, but changing the corrupt, authoritarian, "wiseguy culture" 32 of the
Teamsters will, in any event, take much more than changing the union's top
personnel. That organized labor as a whole seems to be a rapidly fading
economic force 33-a force teetering on irrelevance, if not extinction, in the
28. Id. at 244.
29. There appears to have been virtually no ticket-splitting in the race: each member of the three slates
for General President and 15-member Executive Board received, out of the more than 400,000 votes cast,
virtually identical vote tallies, all across the country and all up and down the slate. Id. at 287-88. Carey
won the General Presidency with fewer than 200,000 votes in a 1.6 million-member union. Id. at 287.
30. George Feldman, The New Teamsters and the Labor Movement, 38 WAYNE L. REV. 527, 527 &
n.2 (1992) (citing Victor Reuther, Congratulatory Telegram to TDU and Carey). Professor Feldman's
excellent, if perhaps overly optimistic, article reviews the history of the Teamsters' litigation and the story
of Carey's election with an eye toward the possibility that the current Teamsters leadership might set a new
ethical and democratic standard for the rest of organized labor. Labor activist and author Tom Geoghegan
shares a good part of this "New Teamster"-induced optimism: "Unions probably did more last year than
in the last 30 or 40 years to improve their image: They threw the mob out of the Teamsters." Pamela
Mendels, Labor in the '90s: A Special Report, NEWSDAY, Sept. 7, 1992, Bus. Sec. at 21.
31. Representative Joseph P. Kennedy, Remarks at the Democratic National Convention (July 15,
1992) ("[W]hen Robert Kennedy was alive, he took on the major unions ... and he said that the union
movement of America should stand up for the rights of working people.... And today we see Ron Carey
taking over the Teamsters Union.. . and 30 years after his work paid fruition.")
32. Fitch, supra note 20, at 19, 74.
33. In 1991, 16.1% of the work force was unionized, down from 25% in 1979. During that same
period, labor union membership declined from 22.6 million to 16.6 million. Only 11.9% of the private
sector work force now consists of union members, a smaller percentage than in 1929. See Kenneth C.
Crowe, Labor in the '90s: A Special Report, NEWSDAY, Sept. 6, 1992, at 84; see also Gerald NV. McEntee,
Labor Law at the Crossroads, 61 CHi.-KFNT L. REv. 663, 664 (1985) (unionized workers, estimated to
comprise 34% of the work force in 1950, are projected to decline to 10% by the year 2000). See generally
MICHAEL GOLDFIELD, THE DECLINE OF ORGANIZED LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES (1987).
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view of some3 --only makes this job more delicate and difficult. The most
recent attempt to overhaul a corrupt union, Arnold Miller's effort in the 1970's
to clean and reinvigorate Tony Boyle's United Mine Workers (UMW), is
widely perceived to have been, at least initially, a failure. And this failure
often has been attributed to the reformers' own overzealotry, naivete, and
inexperienced "grass-roots"-style management.35  With a union more
systematically corrupt, with organized labor as a whole now in steep decline,
and with Carey's own election possibly attributable only to low voter turnout
and a divided opposition, what exactly does one do to keep the UMW's sorry
experience from recurring? How exactly does one build an enduring "culture
of democracy" in the Teamsters?
The remainder of this Essay explores, though by no means provides a clear
and easy answer to, these questions. Part I situates the current Teamsters clean-
up effort within two more general conceptual frameworks: the frequently-made
analogy between the "New Teamsters" and the post-Communist "regime
changes" of Eastern Europe;36 and the much-debated concept of the judge's
proper role in litigation involving "institutional reform. 37 Part II reviews the
most significant postelection interactions between the new Teamsters leaders
and the supervising court, to illustrate how delicate-and potentially
counterproductive-conditions in that crucial sector already have become. The
third Part reviews some developments in post-World War II labor history-or,
rather, some nondevelopments in nonhistory-that may help to explain how the
players in the Teamsters litigation have reached the highly complicated
position they now occupy with so little in the way of relevant experience, or
even academic commentary, upon which to draw. Finally, Part IV describes
steps taken by the newly elected Teamsters leadership to deal with the union's
remaining corruption, and speculates about the future and significance of the
current effort to "clean up" the Teamsters.
34. GEOGHEGAN, supra note 7, at 3 (suggesting that when and if union membership falls below 10%
of the work force, organized labor will lose critical mass).
35. See GEOGHEGAN, supra note 7, at 9-39 (memoirs of lawyer involved in Miller's UMW efforts);
see also Baker, supra note 22, at AI8 (Miller's "union soon fell into disarray because of poor
administration and squabbles between reformers."). After a prolonged transitional interval, and the election
of another reformer president, UMW reform generally is deemed to have gotten back on track. See
generally PAUL F. CLARK, THE MINERS' FIGHT FOR DEMOCRACY: ARNOLD MILLER AND THE REFORM OF
THE UNITED MINE VORKERS (1981).
36. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 22, at A1S (quoting Professor Clyde Summers' comments that in old
days "members of the Teamsters were somewhat like the Poles or Czechs or East Germans"); Baker, supra
note 18, at AI (quoting California Teamsters local lawyer's statement that in the IBT, as in Eastern Europe
and USSR, "You've had this archaic, frozen system in place for 50 years, where a little group of power
brokers at the top wheel and deal and run the joint, and now nobody knows what's going to happen.");
Carlson, supra note 2, at WI5 (noting that old executive board operated "like the Politburo"); see also
Steve Early, Teamsters Election Is a Triumph for Labor, CHRISTIAN SC. MONITOR, Dec. 23, 1991, at 18;
Jonathon Tasini, Perestroika for Teamsters?, NEWSDAY, Nov. 1, 1990, at 80.
37. See Goldberg, supra note 10.
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One thing that this Essay will not do, however, is provide a concise or
handy definition of union "corruption." But the reason that it does not is
central to its still-unfolding story.
I. REGIME CHANGE AND INSTITUTIONAL REFORM
At the time of Carey's election, no one, except perhaps the old Teamsters
leadership itself, doubted that there was a great need for change inside the
Teamsters' marble palace. The old guard had long been accused of personal
corruption and union-subsidized self-indulgence;38 of routinely negotiating
"sweetheart," kickback-laden contracts; widespread conflicts of interest; and
of rampant nepotism and cronyism. Perhaps worst of all, in the eyes of many
members, the old guard was seen as having abandoned new labor organizing
at a time when deregulation of the trucking industry was radically reducing
membership. 39 Thus, although a desire to eliminate corruption was one reason
why the rank-and-file members voted the old guard out, a desire to revitalize
the union as an economic force was another, and possibly an even bigger
38. Like the Teamsters' relationship with La Cosa Nostra, some of this self-indulgence was
institutionalized. The union's constitution, for example, expressly provides that the union shall, "in addition
to all other ... compensation and allowances," pay for "all expenses" of the General President "when
taking periodic rests; the said expenses and allowances shall include travel in this country and abroad, [and]
the full and complete maintenance of his wife so that she can accompany the General President." IBT
Const. art. V, § 2. See Baker, supra note 2, at A27 (noting that secretary-treasurer of local who also served
as president of joint council and IBT vice president earned over $600,000 per year by drawing multiple
salaries); Bob Baker, Accusations Filed Against Teamsters Leader, L.A. TIMES, May 8, 1991, at BI
(characterizing retirement gifts and post-retirement perks); Richard Greer, Atlanta Teamster Reformers
Challenge Old Guard, ATLANTA J. & CONsT., Oct. 4, 1992, at HI, H7 (concluding that local leaders lived
like English royalty). Prior to Carey's election, the union also maintained a fleet of private jets, widely
known as "The Teamster Air Force," see infra note 120.
The fact that many of these practices had been "normalized" (that they were formally approved by
tightly controlled local boards at duly constituted meetings, for example) raises further complications for
the democratization and clean-up process. Cf. United States v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, No. 88 Civ.
4486, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1421 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 1993) (concerning allegations of "interest-free" loan
from local). The "Nuremberg" ex post facto problem is the most prominent: if alleged self-dealing was
"legal" when it occurred, how is it now suddenly to be "punished?" Moreover, as Professor Bruce
Ackerman has noted recently, there is here, as elsewhere in the regime-change process, necessarily a trade-
off involved in any new regime's choice between the different ways of weeding out its corrupt
predecessor's holdovers. On the one hand, a legalistic, "case-by-case" "purge" may be more consistent with
instilling the (new) idea of a "rule of law" in a culture previously accustomed-and adjusted-to
authoritarian behavior; on the other hand, a quick and wholesale purge may serve the same objective by
conveying to the populace that the new regime represents a "clean break" with the past. See BRUCE
ACKERMAN, THE FUTURE OF LIBERAL REVOLUTION 70 (1992). Technically, it should be noted, there is no
formal "Nuremberg" or due process problem here, because the court-appointed officers, who have
conducted such extensive clean-up work for the last four years, have been deemed not to be "state actors"
and are exercising only the "private" authority of the General President and General Executive Board. See
infra text accompanying notes 68-71.
39. Carlson, supra note 2, at W16-17. According to labor writer Jonathan Tasini, who is himself the
President of the National Writers Union, "the majority of IBT leaders nationwide have committed only one
major crime: they have-held on to their lucrative posts and sat on their hands as IBT rank-and-file watched
employers shred their standard of living." Tasini, supra note 36, at 80.
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one.4" After more than a decade in which American labor negotiations had
generally focused on how much the union would "give back" to management,
instead of how much could be "won," a reformer General President genuinely
interested in representing "the members" had two different jobs, only one of
which concerned the elimination of corruption. And it is clear beyond a doubt
that this is how the newly elected Carey saw his task.4 '
Journalists and other commentators commonly compare the Teamsters'
new turn toward democracy with post-Cold War events in Eastern Europe.42
The comparison, no doubt so often made due to the events' chronological
coincidence, is at once true and oversimplified. Both General President Carey
and President Vaclav Havel-as well as Lech Walesa, Boris Yeltsin, and other
post-Communist Eastern European leaders-are indeed engaged in the same
complicated task of liberalizing and re-energizing corrupt one-party states, of
conducting a fundamental "regime change" toward democracy.43 In all of
these situations, the change that the reformers seek has (at least) two parts.
Having suddenly assumed command of a dysfunctional and discredited one-
party apparatus, Carey, like the others, needs urgently both to restart the
economy and to conduct a purge of corrupt holdovers from the past regime.
But these two compelling goals, though sometimes surely linked, 44 may in
practice also be competing,45 in the Teamsters union, as in Eastern Europe.
Too much change too fast, even in the right direction, may be
counterproductive and disruptive.46 The newly arrived leadership's resources,
40. Cf. Fitch, supra note 20, at 24, 71 (quoting TDU leader to the effect that, despite what "most
journalists think," corruption "wasn't the biggest issue" in overwhelming membership rejection of 1983
master freight agreement that contained secret concessionary provisions).
41. Ron Carey, General President, Teamsters Union, Remarks at the National Press Club (Sept. 23,
1992) (C-Span transcript at 7) (on file with author) [hereinafter Carey, Remarks], at 3, 6 ("[Ihe new
Teamsters will be judged, not just [on] whether or not we cleaned up the mess that we inherited....
[History will also ask,] 'Did we build a new, strong, democratic union, moving in the direction of good
jobs?"').
42. See sources cited supra note 36. Carey himself has made the same analogy, contrasting the U.S.
government's praise for the resurgence of democratic unionism in the Polish "Solidarity" movement with
what he sees as its undue intervention in the postelection Teamsters. Carey, Remarks.
43. For a comprehensive political science review of contemporary pro-democracy "regime changes,"
see I TRANSITIONS FROM AUTHORITARIAN RULE: SOUTHERN EUROPE; 2 TRANSITIONS FROM
AUTHORITARIAN RULE: LATIN AMERICA; 3 TRANSITIONS FROM AUTHORITARIAN RULE: COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVES; 4 TRANSITIONS FROM AUTHORITARIAN RULE: TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS ABOUT UNCERTAIN
DEMOCRACIES (Guillermo O'Donnell et al. eds., 1986); see also ROBERT A. DAHL, AFrER THE
REVOLUTION? AUTHORITY IN A GOOD SOCIErY (2d ed. 1990); ROBERT A. DAHL, POLYARCHY (1971).
44. Carey himself has suggested, for example, that the Teamsters' corruption may be partially
responsible for the union's erosion of bargaining aggressiveness and strength, because the former leadership
was more concerned with itself than with the members; thus eliminating the one may be an important (if
not necessarily the first or only important) step toward restoring the other. CROWE, supra note 5, at 142.
Accord Fitch, supra note 20, at 71 ("What really drove the rank-and-file to throw out their leaders was the
recognition that corrupt leaders couldn't effectively fight the employers.").
45. See ACKERMAN, supra note 38, at 70.
46. Cf. Nancy Bermeo, Rethinking Regime Change, 22 COMP. POL. 359, 363 (1990) (summarizing the
views of Robert Dahl to the effect that "gradualism, moderation and compromise" may well be key to
accomplishing peaceful change from authoritarianism to lasting democracy).
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credibility, and concentration can, at any given moment, only stretch so far.47
In the face of such constraints and pressures, how exactly should priorities
between these potentially competing goals be set? How exactly does one
"clean up" the Teamsters in a manner that is fair, and that does not unduly
disrupt (or divert resources from) the equally vital task of restarting the union
as an economic power? What further constraints are imposed by the delicate
and complex relationships between the "new" International and the many semi-
autonomous union affiliates and subsidiaries (pension funds, regional
conferences, joint councils, and powerful locals) where, by all informed
accounts, most of the remaining abuses now reside?4" To ask these questions
with respect to Eastern Europe's new multi-ethnic post-Communist
democracies only requires the most minimal of verbal transpositions.
But despite these many similarities, there is one enormous, and highly
significant, difference between the two situations. In contemporary Eastern
Europe, reform came from below, as the prior regime collapsed; the new turn
toward democracy was not a change-however welcome-that was imposed
from the outside. In the Teamsters, in sharp contrast, there was no sudden
fading of the old guard, nor any sudden grass-roots upsurge. The Teamsters
old guard was, in fact, so well-entrenched, and also so offensive even to those
beyond their direct sway, that they inspired the institutional equivalent of a
foreign invasion. The Teamsters, consequently, are now more like 1945's post-
Hitler Germany than like the current reunited one.49 If there is any real
historical analogue to the current Teamsters situation, therefore, it is not the
47. Cf. id. at 364 (reporting that, following a thorough review of regime-change literature, "one is left
with the impression that those who want to consolidate a post-authoritarian democracy must not only
moderate their demands but possibly 'queue' them, like the tasks in an assembly line. One set of tasks must
be completed before another even begins.").
48. Steven Brill and the Assistant Inspector General of the Labor Department appear to agree in this
assessment of where the remaining problems are, and the former head of the University of Pennsylvania
Industrial Research Institute describes the remaining clean-up task as so "fearfully large" that perfection
is improbable. Robert Davis, To Throw the Bums Out, He Must First Find Them, USA TODAY, Feb. 10,
1992, at 2A; see also Garth L. Mangum, RICO vs. Landrum-Griffin as Weapons Against Union Corruption:
The Teamster Case, 40 LAB. LJ. 94, 95, 100, 103 (1989) (given Teamsters' history of "local power centers,
... cleaning up the IBT would. require more, not less, imposition of International power on the locals"
because "[w]ith the exception of the benefit funds, the opportunities for racketeering are at the lower
level"). Accord Phill Kwik, After Nine Months, New Leadership Is Transforming the Teamsters: But
Resistance from the Old Guard Is Slowing Reform, LAB. NOTEs, Nov. 1992, at I.
According to an attorney with the Association for Union Democracy, General President Carey "barely
has one layer-the top." Baker, supra note 22, at A18. Also, as a delegate to a postelection convention of
the Teamsters for a Democratic Union put it, "at the bottom we've still got the old guard who are not
membership-oriented, but are just out for themselves." Teamster Reform Group Redefines Role in Wake
of Carey's Election as President, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 208, at A-3 (Oct. 27, 1992) [hereinafter
Teamster Reform Group] (quoting Erv Weagner). It is important to recognize, moreover, that these lower-
level, holdover leaders have shown themselves to be tenacious in their resistance to Carey's reforms, and
anxious to protect their own positions for as long as possible, if need be by inciting an actual "counter-
revolution" or large-scale "civil war." Kwik, supra. It has also been suggested that Carey may need to
replace some of his own holdover "International Representatives" who may be, at best, useless political
appointees. Teamster Reform Group, supra.
49. See DAHL, POLYARCHY, supra note 43 (distinguishing between grass roots-induced regime changes
and those resulting from foreign invasion).
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current elimination of ex-Communists in the new democracies of Eastern
Europe. The real European analogue is post-World War II denazification."
A number of important real-world consequences follow, all of which make
the position of the regime-change leaders in the Teamsters far more complex,
at least conceptually, than those of similarly situated Eastern European leaders.
First, in the Teamsters case, as in postwar Germany, an "occupying army"--a
federal court supervising a consent decree-remains firmly and finally in
overall control. As a result, the new Teamsters leadership, unlike the Eastern
Europeans, cannot simply clean out all of the prior regime's suspect holdovers
that they would like or that they believe their circumstances require. They must
instead clean out all of those holdovers that the "occupying force" says they
must remove as a condition of its own withdrawal, as a prerequisite for the
return of the reformers' entity to its autonomous and sovereign status. Perhaps
most significantly they must manage the task of regime change at the
occupying force's pace, and in accordance with its sense of priorities.
Second, because theirs was an outsider-instigated regime change, the new
Teamsters leaders must build a new grass-roots culture of democracy in their
entity from scratch, and from the top, after a transfer of formal power already
has occurred.5' Although, according to one expert, "[t]he record of
democratizations shows that just about the easiest, almost surgical, method of
replacing modem dictatorship with democracy has been war and
occupation, '52 forcibly overthrowing an old regime is not the same as-and
in fact may be much simpler than-building a durable cultural constituency for
a new democratic entity. In the Teamsters, where the regime-change election
results themselves suggest that cynicism and apathy continue to exercise a
strong hold, rank-and-filers must be convinced that democracy is a better
system strictly through the evidence adduced by the newcomers' own
performance in office. And all of the participants are aware that "better" is
likely to be evaluated, in the long run, largely in terms of whether democracy
can "deliver" more.
To make matters more complicated still, these two major differences from
the Eastern European situation are not distinct and separate; they interact
dynamically. The fact that the "occupying force" is still present, and that a new
culture of democracy must now simultaneously be built, means that the consent
decree's surrender of union authority to the government-this final legacy from
the old regime-assumes a more ambiguous significance than the press and
commentators generally have recognized. The intensive and ongoing oversight
mandated by the federal court's decree brings heavy psychological, political,
and cultural costs to the union and its new leaders, not to mention significant
50. Cf. Summers, Union Trusteeships, supra note 10, at 700 (making same analogy with respect to
court's task in a Landrum-Griffin trusteeship context).
51. See Tasini, supra note 36, at 80.
52. GIUSEPPE DIPALMA, To CRAFr DEMOCRACIES 32 (1990).
1993] 1655
The Yale Law Journal
financial ones. 3 Because the membership, and especially the activist-reformer
leaders, predictably will seek to flex their new-found muscle in the postelection
universe, the decree can come to be perceived, and certainly comes to operate,
as a set of constraints upon a suddenly triumphant democratic impulse that has
been long suppressed. Consequently, even if the free and fair election itself
would have been unimaginable without the government's intervention, the
consent decree's constraints may still be deeply resented-at best, ambivalently
accepted-by newly empowered democrats, less deferential and beholden to
their liberators than those well-intentioned liberators might expect or like. Even
in dislocated postwar Germany, it has been said, resistance to post-Nazi reform
apparently was rooted in part in the pure and simple fact that the reforms were
being imposed "from without."'54 It thus is not hard to credit veteran Los
Angeles Times labor reporter Harry Bernstein when he says that, in spite of the
fact that the government's RICO suit was responsible for opening up the
Teamsters, the majority of the union's members nonetheless urgently want to
break the government's grip,55 just as other similarly situated, newly liberated
peoples also often do.
Moreover, American trade unionists are not just a generic "liberated
people." They are a particular, historically situated one, with their own
traditions, values, heritage, and culture, and the postelection Teamsters'
situation implicates those as well. The right to free and independent trade
unions, reflected in Landrum-Griffin,56 is not mere statutory boilerplate. It is
a basic and central component of the labor movement's traditional ideology
and worldview, that serves-or at least can serve-as an animating vision, a
source of personal identity, for a union and its members. The Prerogative of
union members to "clean house themselves' 57 is only one part. The
government's RICO-based effort to clean up the union may well have been
53. The consent decree places the cost of its implementation on the union, and those costs had run to
an estimated $37 million as of mid-1992. James Warren, Song for an Unsung Hero: Mike Holland's
'Government Intrusion' Helped Reform the Teamsters, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 9, 1992, at Tempo 2. But see
United States v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 803 F. Supp. 748, 789 (1992) (arriving at a lower figure
by leaving out costs associated with former leadership's resistance). No matter how the expenses related
to the decree are calculated, they almost certainly contribute to the union's $30.6 million operating deficit.
Kenneth C. Crowe, Talk Softly, Carry a Big Broomstick- New Teamsters Head Pushes Cleanup Effort,
NEWSDAY, May 10, 1992, at 58. Plainly, any cost at all is unwelcome to the new leaders, especially at a
time when the union's budgetary position has created some feeling that a dues increase may be required
despite a powerful "no new taxes" membership mood. Kwik, supra note 48. At a minimum, the money
spent on lawyers and on paying for the federal monitors of course must be diverted from somewhere else,
including, perhaps most painfully, from the revived union organizing efforts that form a central part of
Carey's economic regime-change agenda. See infra text accompanying note 118.
54. See generally John H. Herz, Denazification and Related Policies, in FROM DICTATORSHIP TO
DEMOCRACY: COPING wrIH THE LEGACIES OF AUTHORITARIANISM AND TOTALITARIANISM 15 (John H.
Herz ed., 1982).
55. Harry Bernstein, Ends Justify Means in Teamster Purge, L.A. TIMES, July 2, 1991, at D3.
56. See United Steelworkers of America v. Sadlowski, 457 U.S. 102, 116-17 (1982).
57. 105 CONG. REC. 6476 (1959) (remarks of Senator McClellan) quoted in Jonathan E. Richman,
Note, Facial Adjudication of Disciplinary Provisions in Union Constitutions, 91 YALE L.J. 144, 151 n.42
(1981) (emphasis added).
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legally and morally justified in the context of the union's extraordinary
history. 8 But in the postelection context this outside "invasion" raises anew
not only all of the standard questions about RICO's potentially excessive
elasticity,59 but also the longstanding, fundamental tension between the ideal
of independent, self-governing trade unions and all government regulations and
rules. As one trade union member recalled, in the 1980's, there was once a
time when "it was more like a religion than a union,' 6' and an independence-
minded reform leader's vision, in particular, will inevitably be affected, even
clouded, by a desire to try to bring such times back. His or her behavior will
likely be affected too. For reasons based on strong personal belief, as well as
from a desire to do what will play well with the members, the reformist union
leader is likely to experience a powerful impulse to resist outside intervention,
or to try to control its terms, whether or not doing so, at any given time, seems
to make much sense to those who do not share this vision.6
These competing and conflicting lines of force come together in the much-
debated concept of "the role of the judge in public law litigation,"62 for it is
58. See Bernstein, supra note 55.
59. See generally Gerard E. Lynch, RICO: The Crime of Being A Criminal, Parts I & II, 87 COLUM.
L. REV. 661 (1987); Gerard E. Lynch, RICO: The Crime of Being A Criminal, Parts I & IV, 87 COLUM.
L. REV. 920 (1987); Thomas S. O'Neill, Note, Functions of the RICO Enterprise Concept, 64 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 646 (1989).
60. STUDS TERKEL, THE GREAT DIVIDE: SECOND THOUGHTS ON THE AMERICAN DREAM 168 (1988)
(interview with Cliff "Cowboy" Mazo).
61. Indeed, most recent accounts and descriptions of this once powerful collectively minded trade
union culture focus precisely on the extent to which it is no longer widely shared; they focus on its
breakdown in the face of economic decline, consumerism, mass communication, and postwar (and
particularly Reagan-era) individualism. See RICK FANTASIA, CULTURES OF SOLIDARITY: CONSCIOUSNESS,
ACTION, AND CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN WORKERS 63-72 (1988). TERKEL, supra note 60, at 168-70
(1988). Some see big labor itself as being partially responsible for this ethic's decline. Id. at 166 (interview
with Victor Reuther, founding member and former United Auto Workers president). Cf. Henry Weinstein,
AFL-CIO Plans Ads to Extol Unions' Vrtues, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 26, 1987, at I (public opinion polls show
consistent decline in public image of unions and in belief in unions' necessity). For those outside this
culture, opportunities even to observe it seem recently to have diminished. Since Sayles' 1977 Union Dues,
for example, modem American fiction appears to have turned away from trade union concerns almost
entirely. First-person accounts of "journeys across class lines" by individuals who might conceivably be
this Journal's readers or writers seem mostly to have been limited to Terkel's and Geoghegan's work since
the 1974 publication of JOHN R. COLEMAN, BLUE-COLLAR JOURNAL: A COLLEGE PRESIDENT'S
SABBATICAL (1974). To be sure, these bald generalizations are perhaps less true of the (usually also less
true) movies: the classic On the Waterfront appears to have spawned Norma Rae, Matewan, and Sylvester
Stallone's never-to-be-forgotten EI.S.T., as well as the current Hoffa and any number of documentaries.
62. Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976);
see Lloyd C. Anderson, Implementation of Consent Decrees in Structural Reform Litigation, 1986 U. ILL.
L. REV. 725 (1986); Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term-Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93
HARV. L. REV. 1 (1979); Paul Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 YALE L.J. 585 (1983); David
Rudenstine, Judicially Ordered Social Reform: Neofederalism and Neonationalism and the Debate over
Political Structure, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 449 (1986); Maimon Schwarzschild, Public Law by Private
Bargain: Title VII Consent Decrees and the Fairness of Negotiated Institutional Reform, 1984 DUKE L.J.
887 (1984); Susan P. Sturm, A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies, 79 GEO. L.J. 1355 (1991);
Special Project. The Remedial Process in Institutional Reform Litigation, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 784 (1978).
A comprehensive case study is provided by LARRY W. YACKLE, REFORM AND REGRET: THE STORY OF
FEDERAL JUDICIAL INVOLVEMENT IN THE ALABAMA PRISON SYSTEM (1989). Professor Michael Goldberg's
Cleaning Labor's House, supra note 10, is most immediately germane, but so too are articles that discuss
the pitfalls of judicial involvement in "political thickets" generally. See, e.g., Peter H. Schuck, The Thickest
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the judge alone who ultimately commands the "occupying force." At first
glance, the Teamsters litigation resembles other "institutional reform" litigation
designed to correct abuses in other major social institutions, such as schools,
hospitals, and prisons, through massive, long-term injunctive intervention. But
this simple analogy, like the Eastern European one, also conceals an important
and fundamental difference: given the trade union movement's values and
traditions (not to mention prevailing law),63 one of the central interests that
the court should be protecting is the right of the union's members to run the
institution themselves. There is therefore a tension, and a potentially
paradoxical element, to the Teamsters litigation that is not presented elsewhere.
In this case, unlike others, there may well be a point at which the court's
aggressive involvement "on behalf of' the union members' rights actually
begins to undermine those rights, even if there is, at a strictly logical level, no
inherent contradiction between cleaning up the union and democratizing it.'
In practice, a member's right to have a union free of corruption may not be
entirely consistent with a member's right to exercise independent, autonomous
control.
Consequently, the concerns so frequently voiced about inadequate "interest
representation" 65 and insufficient participation by affected individuals 66 in
institutional reform litigation are especially intense here. The government, the
court, and the law presume that an immediate scorched-earth purge fulfills the
absent class members' fondest desires and reflects their own priorities. But
where autonomy from court control is a separate (but equal) interest of the
class members, it may fairly be doubted whether this well-intended
presumption is entirely true. As Professor Derrick Bell has noted, one's class
action clients may want equality in education, but they may want a quality
Thicket: Partisan Gerrymandering and Judicial Regulation of Politics, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1325 (1987).
63. See Goldberg, supra note 10, at 961-64 (discussing relationship of freedom of association
principles to trade union movement and federal labor law), 1006-07 (advocating separate representation for
members in RICO actions to clean out corrupt labor hierarchies, for the reasons suggested here); See also
infra note 138.
64. Indeed, one part of the post-World War II denazification process actually was called
"democratization through denazification." Herz, supra note 54, at 24; see also JEROME VAILLANT, LA
DENAZIFICATION PAR LES VAINQUERS: LA POLITIQUE CULTURELLE DES OCCUPANTS EN ALLEMAGNE 1945-
1949 (1981) (comparing Allies' different strategies for conducting mass re-education efforts directed toward
building new culture of democracy in occupied Germany). But see INGO MULLER, HITLER'S JUSTICE: THE
COURTS OF THE THIRD REICH 201-98 (Deborah L. Schneider trans., 1991) (suggesting that West Germany
may have long functioned democratically without complete, or even adequate, denazification).
65. See, e.g., Chayes, supra note 62, at 1310-13.
66. See Curtis J. Berger, Away from the Court House and into the Field: The Odyssey of a Special
Master, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 707, 736 (1978) (recounting how community participation lessened resistance
to school desegregation decree); Colin S. Diver, The Judge as Powerbroker: Superintending Structural
Change in Public Institutions, 65 VA. L. REV. 43, 90 (1979) (advocating a "bargaining" approach because
"[V]irtually all organizational theorists stipulate as one condition for successful change the participation
of those whose behavior must be altered"); Note, Implementation Problems in Institutional Reform
Litigation, 91 HARV. L. REV. 428, 436-67 (1977) (counselling courts not to rely "passively" upon "formal,
adversarial processes" during remedial phase).
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education even more.67 There is no reason to believe that a separate interest
in the autonomy of one's union operates on human beings differently.
Other troubling issues confront the judge supervising this unusual case, and
some of these border upon the strictly "legal." Because the court is enforcing
a consent decree reached under RICO, rather than the member-rights
protections contained in Landrum-Griffin, it may frequently be tempted to
extend governmental power beyond otherwise permissible legal bounds.
Landrum-Griffin, to be sure, does provide for pervasive court involvement in
internal union affairs in drastic situations.68 But the Teamsters consent decree
permits the postelection monitor that it establishes to exercise, by settlement-
decree proxy, the almost certainly even broader constitutional powers of the
union's own General President.69 Because these include the power to punish
not just La Cosa Nostra connections, but corruption more generally, as well
as anything that might "bring reproach" upon the union,7" a real question
exists as to whether this consent decree represents a broadening of the
government's power beyond the limits Congress had believed appropriate. The
Second Circuit's holding that the court-appointed officers are not "state
actors"' drains this analysis only of its technical legal force; it retains enough
more general force also to counsel heightened sensitivity on the part of the
court in its enforcement of this consent decree, especially after those who gave
their (self-annihilating) "consent" to the decree are gone.
Finally, even these numerous cultural, policy, and quasi-legal concerns do
not exhaust the special burdens that the postelection Teamsters situation places
on the supervising judge, nor do they fully suggest the peculiarity of his
position. Those burdens are augmented further by the possibly unique role that
the government's case against the Teamsters has required the court to play
during the current, postelection phase. At this point, the decree calls upon the
court to oversee only a single part of the broader regime-change process that
is now in progress. It must oversee the purge. The necessary changes in
bureaucratic rules-the provisions for elections and the like-have already
67. See generally Derrick A. Bell, Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in
School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE LJ. 470 (1976).
68. See Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 29 U.S.C. §§ 461-66, 521 (1988)
(trusteeships and investigations), see also Goldberg, supra note 10, at 937-38. But see infra text
accompanying notes 151-54 (discussing impact of Landrum Griffin). See generally Summers, Democracy,
supra note 10.
69. Consent Decree, supra note 13, at 19. See infra text accompanying notes 85-89 (discussing
postelection monitor).
70. IBT Const. art. II, § 2(a) & art. XIX, § 7(b).
71. United States v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 941 F.2d 1292, 1295-97 (2d Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 1161 (1992). See generally discussion infra Parts III & IV. As previously noted, supra
note 38, this distinction signifies, among many other things, that no formal ex post facto "Nuremberg
problem" is presented, except to the extent that the outside monitors may overstep the General President's
authority for punishing past "bad" behavior that was "legal" within the union at the time. But this itself
raises the further question whether the president of a voluntary association shall be bound by such
constraints.
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been made (they were what precipitated the regime change in the first place),
and eliminating "bad people" is the sole remaining institutional reform at issue.
Thus, the consent decree's "implementation" now effectively amounts to a
continuing process of ad hominem prosecution, and it is safe to say that few,
if any, other institutional reform cases outside the union context have any
comparable phase, or any comparable judge's role.72 Even in its narrow
corruption-fighting capacity, then, the court is plainly sailing in what are, at
best, some poorly charted waters; 73 waters that have not been traversed
terribly successfully before.74
These many tensions in the judge's role are as serious as they are intricate.
Democratic self-control, economic viability, and freedom from corruption are
all simultaneously in play, and the court may already be operating at the outer
edges of its own capabilities and authority. Astute political management,
interpersonal diplomacy, cultural sensitivity, and sheer tact may thus be
especially important components of the judge's role when it comes to the
postelection Teamsters case. The complex prudential judgments required from
a court charged with implementing any consent decree necessarily are
magnified here. After the election, in particular, a narrow focus on eradicating
corruption, the task originally imposed by the consent decree, may not be
enough; something much more modulated, even solomonic, than the normal
focus on achieving attractive "bureaucratic" outcomes may be necessary.
Special sensitivities on the part of the largely "innocent," democratically
elected defendants may be at stake, and those same defendants will also have
other vital regime-change agenda items on their minds. An enlightened court,
faced with this unusual half regime-change, half institutional-reform litigation,
might therefore be wise also to embrace an unusual responsibility: to help
build a culture of democracy, with an eye toward the day when the court itself
eventually withdraws.' For better or for worse, in a case like this, where a
new reform-oriented leadership has been chosen in an election certified by the
government as having been uniquely clean and fair, and where a union and its
members have been suffering not just ethically but economically, a special
burden may well rest upon the court not to let the old paradox from Vietnam
resurface: not inadvertently to "destroy the village in order to save it."
To assume that the court can avoid this risk, however, is to assume
something else: that the American labor movement itself knows how to
72. Consideration of the contempt proceedings that other institutional reform cases often involve,
which may give the superficial appearance of being similar, serves to underscore the point. In the ordinary
institutional reform case, contempt hearings follow the alleged violation of a remedial decree that was
prospective at the time when it was entered. "Do not have been corrupt" is the court's real order here.
73. But see Goldberg, supra note 10 (describing previous efforts to "purge" corrupt unions and locals,
and substantial legal bases under RICO and Landrum-Griffin for asserting such authority); Summers, Union
Trusteeships, supra note 10 (conceding the necessity for intrusive and long-lasting trusteeships).
74. Goldberg, supra note 10.
75. See generally id., at 1003-10.
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undertake extensive or aggressive efforts to eradicate union corruption and
dishonesty "from the top." As shall be seen,76 there is little evidence to
support such an assumption. For a variety of reasons-legal, cultural,
historical, institutional, and personal-the higher reaches of organized labor in
America have felt no need, nor have they shown much inclination, to address
the issue of internal union corruption for a good long time. In the current
Teamsters litigation, judges, court-appointed monitors, reform-oriented elected
officers, anti-reform-oriented officers, and millions of rank-and-file members
all have different agendas, perspectives, attitudes, and interests. But when it
comes to cleaning up the Teamsters-to conducting a radical, top-down regime
change in an American labor union-few individuals on any side possess
genuinely relevant experience. Improvisation may be the only course that is
available to anyone responsible for managing this fundamental regime change
or, for that matter, any other.77 The most that anyone can hope for may be
that this inevitable improvisation will be fact specific and context sensitive.
The only thing that all the players here should know is that they all must
improvise together. It is perhaps true that "the perspectives of the courts and
the organizations they seek to change are, in the nature of things, radically
different" at all times and in all circumstances." But if "participation in the
formulation of a remedy" by affected individuals and entities serves "an
independent value" whenever meaningful reform is achieved through structural
litigation,79 one may fairly assume that such participation has an even higher
value when a case involves enforcing a decree negotiated by a party now
discredited and departed.80 And the value of this participation is bound only
to be enhanced further when the long-term objective of all concerned is-or
at least should be-to build a clean, autonomous, economically viable, and
durably democratic institution.
II. OPERATION OVERLORD
How well all the parties actually are working together is perhaps best seen
by examining a series of events that followed entry of the consent decree,
76. See discussion infra Part Ill.
77. Robert Dahl, for one, notes the near impossibility of drawing general conclusions-much less of
writing precise guidebooks-for regime-change participants based upon the study of previous cases in
which an outside "invasion" has resulted in the democratization of a particular political system. To the
contrary, he concludes that "concrete historical statements, or predictions based upon a particular
configuration of international forces at a specific time, may be more fruitful than theoretical generalities
about the interplay between foreign domination and polyarchy." DAHL, POLYARCHY, supra note 43, at 193.
Carey appears at least to have made an effort to tap such experience as may be around: he hired as his
Special Assistant, and later appointed to the Independent Review Board. See infra text accompanying notes
103-06, a leading figure in the UMW reform administration; see also CROWE, supra note 5, at 8-12.
78. Donald L. Horowitz, Decreeing Organizational Change: Judicial Supervision o Public Institutions,
1983 DUKE L.J. 1265, 1297 (1983).
79. Sturm, supra note 62, at 1377.
80. See Berger, supra note 66.
1993] 1661
The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 102: 1645
events that convey both the depth of the new leadership's feelings regarding
their own autonomy and the often "Byzantine 8' flavor of this highly unusual
structural reform litigation.
The decree mandated two separate phases of implementation. In the first
phase, it provided for a court-appointed Independent Administrator charged
with responsibility for overseeing the clean-up process through the
investigation and removal of corrupt officers, a process that was to be
accomplished in large measure through the front-line efforts of two additional
court-appointed officers. 82 A tireless and aggressive Investigations Officer
eventually investigated nearly two hundred Teamsters officials and displaced
almost one hundred, 3 and an Election Officer3 scheduled and conducted a
free and, most significantly, direct85 secret ballot rank-and-file election for the
81. United States v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 948 F.2d 1338, 1340 (2d Cir. 1991).
82. See Consent Decree, supra note 13, at 7-18 (spelling out the responsibilities and powers of the
court-appointed officers). The Administrator was to have the same corruption-fighting powers as the IBT's
General President and General Executive Board, id. at 7, and was to use a "just cause" standard for
imposing sanctions, id. at 9.
83. Davis, supra note 48, at 2A (151 officials charged; 26 reputed mobsters barred; 37 top members
"kicked out"; 27 more suspended); Robert L. Jackson, Union Reformers Taking a Back Seat to Outsiders
in Cleanup of Teamsters, L.A. TIMES, July 7, 1992, at A5 (170 officials charged; 50 have resigned; 22 have
agreed to make restitution to the union); Elisabeth Lesly, No. 2 Teamster Faces Probe of Vote-Rigging,
WASH. TIMEs, Aug. 10, 1992, at Al (charges filed against nearly 200; 95% of expulsions sought by
Investigations Officer upheld by supervising court).
84. In general, the Election Officer, a Chicago attorney, performed his functions with the highest
diplomacy, determination, and skill, after some initial controversies with union democracy activist groups
concerning his initial election rules, which would have allowed the elections to be conducted through the
old-guard-controlled locals. CROWE, supra note 5, at 122-28. The court set aside these rules and ordered
the Elections Officer to undertake much more direct and detailed control of the election process. Id. at 126-
28. The federal government also has the right to supervise the IBT's 1996 elections, though at its own
expense. Consent Decree, supra note 13, at 16.
Whether because of modesty or culturally sophisticated shrewdness, the Election Officer accepted only
a labor-lawyer hourly rate of $125 for his extensive services, in sharp contrast to the rates charged by the
New York-based Administrator and Investigations Officer. The Administrator was initially guaranteed a
$340-per-hour rate, later raised by the court to $385 in response to the Administrator's request. The
Investigations Officer received $250. Warren, supra note 53. The $385 hourly figure for the Administrator
does not include the Administrator's health and other benefits, however, which raise the effective hourly
rate to at least $500 per hour. Kenneth C. Crowe, Friction Drives the Hearings in the Judge's Watch over
Teamsters, NEWSDAY, Oct. 4, 1992, at 86. The Administrator, who also became the government's appointee
to the Independent Review Board, draws a $100,000-plus-overtime salary in that second capacity, and the
court ruled that he may continue to be paid in both capacities until the Administrator's backlogged docket
winds down. United States v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15016 (S.D.N.Y.
Oct. 6, 1992).
These substantial fees have been a major source of irritation to the union throughout the postelection
period. The reasons may not be strictly budgetary. Issues of social class may also be involved. At a
National Press Club appearance, Carey, whose own wife works at Macy's, seemed to be genuinely amazed
by the fact that anyone could make $385 an hour before what was probably a well-heeled audience, he
emphasized "not per day, per hour." Carey, Remarks, supra note 41, at 7.
85. In the view of one recent commentator, the significance of this direct election procedure can hardly
be overstated: Geoghegan maintains that direct grass-roots elections for high union positions-an extreme
rarity under the by-laws of most major labor organizations (which usually rely upon complicated, and easily
co-opted, multi-tier election procedures)-would be something like a "silver bullet" solution to all of labor's
corruption and economic problems. Thomas Geoghegan, American Labor's Dark, Romantic Years, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 2, 1991, at 19. But see Herman Benson, More Than Meets the Eye, 87 UNION DEMOCRACY
REV., Apr. 1992, at 6-7 (suggesting that dissidents' success in UMW and IBT may be causing them to
overrate direct elections' value).
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union's top leadership positions. Despite considerable incumbent-inspired
litigation, these first rank-and-file elections for General President and for the
sixteen-member General Executive Board were conducted in a fair and open
manner.
In the decree's second phase, which was to begin after the December 1991
election (and which actually became effective in the fall of 1992), the
Administrator was to be replaced by a three-member Independent Review
Board (IRB) charged with continuing the investigative and disciplinary aspects
of the extensive clean-up process. The decree provided that the Department of
Justice and the union each would choose one member of the IRB and that the
two appointed members would then jointly choose the third, in a manner
resembling other arbitration-oriented labor law devices.86 The IRB, whose
anti-corruption mandate was defined so as to be coextensive with the
corruption-fighting powers granted to the General President by the IBT
constitution, had no expiration date. 7 To the contrary, by court-ordered
constitutional amendment, the IRB was to be made a permanent part of the
union's own fundamental law 88 -an internal anti-corruption watchdog, half-
appointed by the U.S. government. Like others of its kind, the consent decree
also provided for a return to the court whenever the court's assistance was
deemed necessary to secure the decree's implementation.89
Probably not surprisingly, during the pre-election phase, the court-
appointed officers met with considerable resistance. Indeed, promptly after
"settling" the case, the old guard mounted a tooth-and-nail resistance to every
aspect of its actual implementation.9" Removals were contested, election rules
disputed, and as many of the consent decree's provisions as possible ignored
or evaded, sometimes in quite ingenious ways.9' The Administrator and the
court had every reason to perceive the decree's implementation as just
involving more ordinary litigation, and to assume an ordinary adversarial
attitude toward the implementation process generally throughout the pre-
election phase.
But even if the old guard's pitched resistance to the consent decree was
unsurprising, one incident occurring during the pre-election phase strongly
suggests that more than mere rear-guard self-defense was at issue and
86. Consent Decree, supra note 13, at 19.
87. Id.
88. Id., at 23.
89. Id. at 25. The decree as a whole continues in effect until the court grants "a joint motion of the
parties ... for entry of judgment dismissing this action with prejudice," id. at 2, an event that, it is fair to
say, is unlikely to occur for some time.
90. See Butterfield, supra note 18, at Al.
91. Among these was an effort by the old guard to change the organization's official magazine, The
International Teamster, from a monthly to a quarterly publication, so that the rank-and-file would see the
Administrator's "Messages" to concemed members less frequently. Carlson, supra note 2, at W16, see also
Butterfield, supra note 18, at Al, A3. The consent decree authorized the Administrator to print these
messages in "each" issue of the magazine. Consent Decree, supra note 13, at 16.
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illustrates the sensitive context within which the court was operating. As noted,
the consent decree contained an unusual provision reflecting in a concrete way
the special nature of structural reform litigation involving an institution that
was at least formally "democratic." Possibly because of a concern that the
named old-guard defendants might lack legal authority under the union's
constitution to settle the case in such a way as to make their own deal stick,
the decree required that certain of the changes agreed to by the named
defendants also be incorporated into the IBT constitution at the group's June
1991 convention.92 In other words, the old guard's consent decree required
that delegates to a new national convention-who were also for the first time
(thanks to the decree) to be democratically elected through a secret-ballot rank-
and-file election,93 and who themselves had never elected the old guard in the
first place-would be forced to vote to accept changes in their union's
fundamental law that the discredited old guard had negotiated, whether the
delegates wanted to or not.
When the convention was held in June 1991, the resistance of the
assembled delegates to this requirement turned out to be enormous, and it did
not break down tidily on old-guard versus new-guard lines.94 Delegates
associated with the old guard naturally opposed the proposed amendments as
a matter of basic substance, and indeed, it may have been precisely the old
guard's objective to have its hand-picked delegates, who were still very much
in the majority at this meeting,95 refuse to abide by this portion-as by all
other portions--of the decree's overall reform plan. But many of the reform-
92. These constitutional changes included a post-hoc extension of the union's own "statute of
limitations" regarding internal corruption from one year to five, Consent Decree, supra note 13, at 4;
clarification of the General President's ability to suspend members and officers facing criminal or civil trial,
id. at 5; a prohibition on the use of outside funding for union election campaigns, id. at 5; new procedures
for filling the office of General President (by direct election), id. at 5, 13-15; and the permanent
establishment of the IRB, id. at 19. If the IBT did not formally amend its constitution at the convention,
the government retained the right to have the court forcibly impose these changes. Id. at 5-6. The old-guard
leadership had thus effectively handed over to the government the unjoined rank-and-file members'
constitutional "proxy," apparently based upon its authority under the constitution to amend through the
General Executive Board, rather than through a convention, in cases where a court had declared that one
or more portions of the constitution was "invalid or inoperative." IBT Const. art. XXVI, § 2. It may have
been because the government doubted the validity or applicability of this constitutional provision that it had
the amendments put to the convention anyway, although prior to the convention, in May 1991, it also took
pains to secure a judicial ruling declaring that the amendments would be imposed by the court if the
convention failed to ratify them. United States v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 764 F. Supp. 787
(S.D.N.Y. 1991). See generally CROWE, supra note 5, at 206-07. When the amendments ultimately were
imposed through court order, see infra text accompanying note 97, the applicability of the provision was
upheld. United States v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 905 F.2d 610, 622-23 (2d Cir. 1990).
93. See CROWE, supra note 5, at 172-73. The same convention also served as the nominating forum
for the candidates for the December election. Id. That Carey entered the convention with only 240
nominating votes, out of a total of 1,926 delegates, id. at 204-06, provides further evidence of the political
precariousness of his position. Establishment candidates garnered over 80% of delegates from the pre-
convention voting. Merrill Goozner, With Teamsters Democracy Doesn't Come Overnight, CHi. TRIB., June
30, 1991, Perspective at 1.
94. Baker, supra note 2.
95. See Goozner, supra note 93.
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minded activists suddenly in attendance at the 1991 convention, painfully
aware of how long their democratic rights had been suppressed and denied,
were displeased as well. For them, the issue was union independence. Their
idea of union reform did not involve exchanging one dictator for another, or
being forced to legitimate an agreement that the two resented "dictators" had
struck with one another.
96
When the convention strongly rejected the constitutional reforms that the
consent decree had mandated, those changes were forcibly imposed by the
court, in accordance with a falback provision contained in the decree.97 To
make the tensions between the court and the convention even worse, an
additional set of constitutional amendments proposed and adopted by the
convention's suddenly inspired delegates was set aside by the Independent
Administrator. This reform-oriented proposal to establish an Ethical Practices
Committee composed of prominent outsiders, and designed to have extensive
powers to root out corruption, was supported by both old- and new-guard
delegates alike.9' From the Independent Administrator's point of view, such
a potentially "competing" body might well have seemed like a threat (or even
another well-planned old-guard design) to slow or complicate the task of
cleaning up the union. 99 Whatever the (quite possibly substantial) merits of
that suspicion may have been, it at least was clear, as of June 1991, that
independence and reform were already somewhat at loggerheads.
These gathering intimations of a potential conflict between the ethos of
institutional reform and the ethos of union self-control were, unfortunately,
realized in full immediately after Carey assumed office in February of 1992.
Although the consent decree provided that the two members of the now-
operative postelection IRB would jointly select the third, when the time came
to make that crucial selection an impasse quickly developed: each list of
nominees for the third IRB slot put forward by one of the already-appointed
IRB members was promptly vetoed by the other. Resolution of the impasse
was referred to the court, in accordance with the decree, and the proceedings
there at once revealed a fundamental clash between the prevailing ethos of
"ordinary litigation" and the culture of democratic trade unionism. Despite the
96. At the convention local union officials were quoted as having told the old leadership, for example,
that "you put it on us ... You should be ashamed of having to have the government come in .... "
Another asked, "Who signed the consent decree? Who spent $12 million of our members' money fighting
it?" Merrill Goozner, Teamsters Attack U.S. Intervention, CHI. TRIB., June 25, 1991, Bus. at I. Discussing
the promised fair and open election, Carey himself put the members' dilemma over the role of the
"occupying force" most succinctly during the debate on these amendments: "I don't want the government
in, but I'm in favor of the right to vote." Id.
97. United States v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 905 F.2d 610 (2d Cir. 1990); Frank Swoboda,
Teamsters Jeer Bush, Court Order; U.S. Imposes Reforms After Delegates' Vote, WASH. POST, June 25,
1991, at Cl. See supra note 92 (discussing validity of this external imposition of constitutional
amendments).
98. Swoboda, supra note 22.
99. Id.
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union-appointed IRB member's strong objection, the court imposed as the
IRB's third member the government appointee's nominee, William
Webster-former U.S. Attorney, former federal judge, former FBI and CIA
director, and current board of directors member of the IBT-organized employer
Anheuser-Busch.1°° But perhaps more important than this ruling is what the
court's opinions arising from this incident reveal about the potential for
culturally based misunderstandings between reform-oriented judges and
government-selected monitors, on the one hand, and reform-oriented union
leaders, on the other-between the "ordinary" adversarial culture and the more
collectively oriented independent trade union culture generally.
Surprisingly, this profound conflict did not initially manifest itself in any
discussion of the question of who the third member of the IRB would be. The
clash first became apparent in the court's remarks concerning exactly who the
union-appointed member was,' 0' confusion over which, according to the
court, was responsible for the third-member impasse. 2 In the view of the
court, this impasse arose largely because the Teamsters-appointed member had
fundamentally misperceived his own IRB role, as had Carey, who appointed
him. 0 3 Although the consent decree required that all of the members of the
IRB be truly "independent"'1' 4 of any of the parties, Carey had appointed his
own Special Assistant. Noting that this dual position might create both "an
untenable conflict of interest" (if Carey's own office ever had to be
investigated, for example), as well as an "intolerable appearance of bias" with
respect to the IRB's adjudicatory function in disciplinary cases, the court
interpreted the decree so as to bar from appointment to the IRB any person
actually holding union office. 05 The court therefore held that any officer so
100. Carey found this last fact to be particularly objectionable, claiming that this corporate board
position represented a serious "conflict of interest" for Webster. Federal Judge Names William Webster to
Independent Teamsters Review Board, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 151, at A-16 (Aug. 5, 1992). The judge
did not find Webster's board membership to be significant, however, stating that, as a member of the IRB,
Webster would have "no role in labor-management relations," United States v. International Bhd. of
Teamsters, 803 F Supp. 806, 817 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), and noting with seeming approval that none of the
Teamsters lawyers had "had the impudence" to suggest that Webster's corporate board membership
presented a potential conflict of interest. Id. It bears noting that recently issued rules pertaining to
presidential transition work, dealing with similar issues, have been criticized extensively for permitting
corporate board members to participate in matters related to the companies on whose boards they serve.
Jason DeParle, Experts Find Loopholes in Clinton's Ethics Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 1992, at A8(collecting disapproving remarks from ethics experts on law school). Webster subsequently also joined the
board of directors of the once-infamous Pinkerton Agency, a move not likely to unruffle any knowledgeable
trade unionist's already-ruffled feathers. Herman Benson, Who Will Monitor "Ethical Practices" in the
Teamsters Union?, 91 UNION DEMOCRACY REv., Nov. 1992, at 2.
101. United States v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 803 F. Supp. at 815-16.
102. Id. at 811-12.
103. The impasse was not limited to determining the identity of the IRB's third member but extended
to disputes concerning office space, operating and internal voting rules, expenses, and compensation-in
effect, the entire IRB. United States v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 803 F. Supp 761, 768-70, 790-99
(S.D.N.Y. 1992).
104. Id. at 796-97.
105. Id.
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appointed would be required to resign his or her IBT position before serving
on the IRW 06
When the court subsequently addressed the impasse concerning the naming
of the IRB's third member directly, it returned to this same theme. Opening
the discussion with the candid recognition that he was confronting a
"fundamental philosophical difference" between the IRB's two existing
members, 7 the judge focused on the IBT-appointed member's use of the
term "the neutral party" in a letter to the government-appointed Board member
as a way of describing the as yet unappointed member of the IRB. t18 In
using this term, the judge said, the IBT-appointed member had displayed a
fundamental misperception of the essential nature of the IRB as that body was
contemplated by the decree. The IBT appointee's use of this weighted phrase,
the judge believed, "ignores that the IBT and the Government do not have
separate and distinct interests in IRB operation."'" The IRB, the judge
continued, "is meant to have three, three neutral members-not two partisans
106. Id. See also United States v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 803 F. Supp 806, 815-16 (S.D.N.Y.
1992). Ironically, on October 16, 1992, the Justice Department-appointed member of the IRB himself (who
was the same individual who had been serving-and who continued to serve--as the Independent
Administrator, supra note 84) accepted an additional appointment from the Department of Justice. United
States v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 808 F. Supp. 271, 272-73 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). Pursuant to his
appointment as a nonstatutory "special prosecutor," he was to investigate a possible federal government
cover-up in the alleged "Iraqgate" scandal, which included allegations of possible impropriety on the part
of Justice Department officials. Id. at 272-73. When the IBT's lawyers argued that the acceptance of this
appointment was inconsistent with the same IRB rule that had been applied to Carey's (by now former)
Special Assistant during the previous summer, the court informed the IBT's lawyers that the inconsistency
was theirs. Id. at 273. Charging them not only with having previously offered an interpretation of that rule
different from the one that they had now put forward (i.e., during the previous summer's controversy
surrounding the IBT's IRB appointee, prior to the rule's ever having been interpreted or applied), the court
declared their later interpretation to be "mechanistic," id., "patently unreasonable," id., and "robotic," id.
at 275, evidencing (at best) "intellectual myopia," id., if not "intransigence and mindless opposition," id.
at 275, to the consent decree and a "desire to stymie the work of the IRB at all costs," id. at 276. Holding
that the rule in question was "primarily" designed to prohibit "full-time Government or IBT employeefs]"
from serving on the IRB, the court concluded that this additional .Justice Department appointment would
not even create the "appearance" of pro-government bias or partiality on the part of the Justice Department-
appointed IRB member. Id. at 274. When the special prosecutor's report, which recommended no
indictments, was eventually released, it was, rightly or wrongly, "widely regarded as a whitewash" in the
media. Marcia Chambers, Sua Sponte, NAT'L LJ., Dec. 28, 1992-Jan.4, 1993, at 13. See William Safire,
Iraqgate Deadline Day, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 1992, at A19 (denouncing IRB member as a "patsy
prosecutor"); Harry Bernstein, Get High-Priced Help Out of Teamsters, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 19, 1993, at D3
(accusing IRB member of being a salary "double dipper," like the old-guard Teamsters leaders); Editorial,
Mr Barr's Cloud: Growing Darker, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 1992, at A38 (IRB member's report "incredible,"
his "ostensibly independent" investigation a "squalid exercise;" based upon reading his report, the IRB
member himself seems "far more interested in finding scapegoats than in finding facts"). Fairly or unfairly,
an "appearance" question with respect to the other Justice Department role of this IRB member, indeed,
seemed to have been raised.
The IRB rule at issue in this matter provides, in full, that "No member of the IRB or its staff,
including the Chief Investigator, shall, at the same time he holds any position with the IRB, hold any
position with the Government, the IBT, or any IBT affiliate, other than membership in the IBT." Rules and
Procedures of the Independent Review Board § F(3), reprinted in United States v. International Bhd. of
Teamsters, 803 F Supp. 761, 801 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
107. 803 F. Supp. at 812-13 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
108. Id. at 811, 815.
109. Id. at 815.
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and one neutral member."" Discounting the LBT-appointed member's
assertion that the term "neutral" is a term of art in arbitration-oriented labor
union circles, the judge declared that use of the term demonstrated the
"partisan mind-set" brought by the IBT appointee and the IBT itself to the IRB
as an institution."' And the judge found further evidence of this same
erroneous perception in the IBT appointee's use of "the plural pronoun 'we...
in a letter that he had written to the government appointee expressing his views
on another IRB-related matter. The use of such a term, the court said, indicated
that the IBT-appointed member saw himself more as a union representative
than as a detached outsider, and the use of such a term was therefore, in the
court's view, "chilling" evidence that "a Union which entered into the consent
decree to eradicate improper outside influences, would itself improperly
influence an independent body designed to achieve this goal.""'
Nor did this by now wide-open cultural clash end there. If anything, an
even sharper conflict between the legal and trade union cultures was evidenced
in the court's subsequent remarks concerning two of the IBT's now passed-
over nominees for the IRB's third seat, each of whom was a former U.S.
Secretary of Labor. Conceding that the these two nominees had distinguished
personal reputations, and the fact that "their positions as Secretaries of Labor
entailed an investigative aspect,""' 3 the court nonetheless concluded that
these two former cabinet officials lacked "the breadth and depth of
investigatory and judicial experience necessary to perform tasks that are
essential to the IRB's mandate under the Consent Decree."" 4 In the view of
the court, in other words, the IRB was solely about prosecuting, and not about
trade unionism' 5-about prosecution generically, moreover, not prosecution
in the labor union context. A more dramatic example of the incongruity
between the different visions of what the Teamsters' regime change meant
would be difficult to invent.
The point is not to take issue with the court's specific rulings, whether or
not they seem entirely well-advised. The point is rather to highlight possible
differences in perception that may be induced by the side of the bench one is
on, and by the culture one inhabits. Despite having perceived that it was in the
presence of a "fundamental philosophical difference," the court seemingly
made little effort to bridge or to mediate, rather than simply to adjudicate, that
dispute. Moreover, to insist, as the court did, that the "union that entered into
the consent decree" is exactly the same union as the one that committed the
110. Id. (quoting transcript of Aug. 4, 1992 hearing)..
111. Id. at 816.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 816 (citing Labor Management Relations Disclosure Act, 29 U.S.C. § 501 (1988)).
114. Id.
115. The court said "the IRB is an investigative and adjudicative body," id. at 815, which "has no role
in day-to-day affairs of the Union," id. at 814.
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alleged postelection "impropriety" is to misconstrue and undervalue what this
unprecedented decree-and the court's own unflagging efforts to have it
enforced" 6-- already had accomplished. Whether or not the IBT's approach
to the IRB-appointment controversy was the most shrewd and subtle possible,
the real question is whether the presumably more dispassionate court should
have found even an alleged "impropriety" of this sort to be so "chilling,"
coming, as it did, from the agent of a democratically elected trade union
regime-change leader. For the court to have done so is for it to have
shortchanged the political, not to mention the economic, nature of the regime-
change process that it now was supervising.
Technically-that is, legally-the court was of course correct: the union
now before the court is, of course, the same one that entered into the decree.
But heartfelt independence and hard-core intransigence are not the same, even
when they look similar. The Teamsters' enormous problems with corruption
are far from over, if they ever will be. And yet in the context of union reform,
experience and reason both suggest that reform should not just be ordered, but
encouraged, out of a realization that a culture will endure after the court is
gone.' 7 Signs of emergent democratic self-confidence-of the reinvigoration
of traditional trade union values-are far from unhealthy at the Teamsters. At
most, they are only normal. And in the context of the Teamsters, that itself is
progress.
m. BACKGROUND SILENCES
Any creditable regime-change expert observing Carey's behavior in the
months immediately following his February 1992 inauguration would have had
no choice but to conclude that Carey had decided to "queue up"1 8 the
economic and politically symbolic items on his reformist agenda first. Upon
his swearing in, Carey immediately cut his own salary by $50,000,9 sold
the union's condos, limousines, and private jets,' and enforced the new
prohibition against the International officers' long-denounced practice of
drawing multiple salaries.' He transferred the $11 million in proceeds from
116. By the early winter of 1993, the court had intervened in the case more than one hundred times
since the consent decree was entered, and the meter will of course continue to run for some time to come.
117. See Goldberg, supra note 10, at 1005-06.
118. See Bermeo, supra note 46, at 364.
119. Frank Swoboda, Carey Is Sworn in as President of Teamsters, WASH. POST, Feb. 2, 1992, at A7.
The new salary was $175,000, down from a previous $225,000. Id.
120. Jackson, supra note 83; Carlson, supra note 2, at WI8. The size of the former "Teamster Air
Force," as Carlson calls it, appears to be a matter of dispute. Jackson says there were two jets and Carlson
says four. The New York 7imes votes for two, and adds that the current International General President of
the IBT--the incumbent successor to Jimmy Hoffa, Frank Fitzsimmons, and Jackie Presser-now not only
flies commercial, but coach. Kilbom, supra note 20, at 27.
121. That the new prohibition against this practice applied only to officers of the International (i.e.,
not to officers of locals, Regional Conferences, etc.) was the result of one of the less disinterested actions
of the 1991 convention, many of whose delegates were lower-level 1BT officials. Frank Swoboda, Teamster
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these various sales and cutbacks to a new fund dedicated to jump-starting the
union's flagging organizing efforts, as one part of a larger effort to increase the
union's organizing staff tenfold.122 He established official budgets for the
union's operations-"a previously unheard-of practice."' 3 He also launched
the first "corporate campaign" in Teamsters history, as a way of organizing
new workers by bringing public and community pressure to bear on employers
without risking current workers' jobs. 24 He was simultaneously swept up in
personally renegotiating a series of national collective bargaining agreements
that were about to expire, as well as in managing the union's response to a
variety of other crises, including a nationwide demonstration against car-haul
dealerships.' 25 He revamped and renamed the union's magazine-it is now
The New Teamster-and, in a series of nationwide swings through the
hustings, attempted to re-energize the rank-and-file membership for further
activism and reform. In a major break with longstanding Teamsters tradition,
Carey, himself an ex-Marine Republican, 26 moved the union (and $4 million
in "get out the vote" and other funds) behind Democratic Presidential candidate
Bill Clinton for the 1992 election.'27 In his first "one hundred days," as one
source put it, Carey "had the Teamsters acting like a union."'128
Amidst all of this economically oriented regime-change activity, however,
major new efforts to root out the remaining IBT corruption did take something
of a back seat. Almost immediately upon assuming office, Carey announced
his intention to appoint an internal Ethical Practices Committee, 1 9 to be run
under his constitutionally established corruption-fighting authority as General
President (which meant that this Committee, unlike the one proposed at the
1991 convention, could be run without a constitutional amendment). The new
Vote Cap on Officers Pay; Delegates Still Allow Local Leaders to Hold Multiple Union Jobs, WASH. POsT,
June 27, 1991, at B14.
122. CROWE, supra note 5, at 264-66.
123. Behar, supra note 22, at 61.
124. Carey, Remarks, supra note 41, at 7. Of course, firing workers for engaging in union organizing
is impermissible, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1988), but in recent times, according to experienced observers, the
effectiveness of these legal protections may be doubted. See GEOGHEGAN, supra note 7, 252-54 (discussing
underenforcement of these provisions in 1980's, which allowed employers to accept "unfair labor practices"
findings, with minimal penalties, years after organizing campaigns were stopped by firing employees
engaged in union organizing); accord Richard B. Freeman & Joel Rodgers, A New New Deal for Labor,
N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 10, 1993, at A19.
125. Crowe, supra note 52. At least one high profile local strike also became a focus of the General
President's personal attention. Ron Carey to Join Washington Talks Aimed at Settling Pittsburgh Press
Strike, [Current Developments] Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 189, at A9 (Sept. 29, 1992). These and other
developments (most notably, a threatened Northwest Airlines Flight Attendants "defection" to another
union, a major campaign involving Safeway supermarkets, and a dispute involving The New York Times)
were summarized in The New York Times by Kilbom, supra note 20, at 27, 32.
126. CROWE, supra note 5, at 132.
127. Id. at 265-66.
128. Fitch, supra note 20, at 21.
129. Federal Judge Issues Rules Governing Operation of Teamsters Review Board, [Current
Developments] Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 163, at A8 (Aug. 21, 1992); see infra Part IV.
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reform-oriented General Executive Board promptly approved this move.' 30
Two particularly suspect locals were put under new International trusteeships,
although one of the trustees Carey appointed was himself under an ethical
cloud.' 3' Well aware of the difficulty of finding and eradicating Teamsters
corruption strictly from the top, the union's long-time grass-roots dissidents did
not seem unduly disturbed by the pace of postelection ethical reform.1 32 But
in mid-1992, the supervising judge, despite having indicated that he considered
the proposed Ethical Practices Committee to be a positive initial step, 33 said
that he found Carey's ethical reform efforts during his first seven months in
office to have been, on the whole, "anemic"'
134 and "pathetic."' 35
Still, even if Carey indeed may have been showing some signs of ethical
"anemia," he was not alone. He was, to the contrary, in the middle of a labor
movement-wide epidemic, and the disease from which he suffered had a quite
specific social and historical etiology. The truth is that any reform-minded new
president of any corrupt union would have been writing on a largely blank
historical slate. Indeed, on a mostly blank conceptual and academic slate as
well: for although the literature on union "democracy" is extensive, the
literature on internal union "ethics" is virtually nonexistent. 36 For many
130. Resolution of the General Executive Board, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Feb. 3, 1992
(on file with author).
131. Carey subsequently acknowledged that this appointment had been "a mistake." Behar, supra note
22.
132. One of the newly elected Executive Board members, who was also co-chair of TDU's
International Steering Committee, pointed out, to apparent approval, at the dissident group's annual
convention that "It took a long time to screw this union up; its going to take a while to fix it. ... Some
things can't be done by the General Executive Board, they have to be done at the local level." Teamster
Reform Group Redefines Role in Wake of Carey's Election as President, [Current Developments] Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 208, at A-3 (Oct. 27, 1992) (quoting Diana Kilmury, IBT Vice President At Large).
A TDU member who was a vice president on a local executive board said, "It's going to take two or three
years to see reform take hold. There are substantial areas of resistance." Id. (quoting Steve McDonald).
Such support was not unanimous, however. Some reformer activists thought Carey had lost the
opportunity to cleanse the union by failing to strike aggressively during his "first one hundred days." See,
Fitch, supra note 20, at 73-74. Still others saw a positive reason for failing to move too rapidly to conduct
a radical house cleaning: Carey simply needed the middle level old-guard leadership in order to wage a
successful economic campaign against the large companies by whom so many Teamsters are employed.
Id. at 73. In this, Carey's position does not differ much from that of other contemporary regime-change
leaders. See, e.g., Theodore Draper, A New History of the Velvet Revolution, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Jan. 14,
1993, at 14, 19 (many Czech Communists "were protected after the fall" because so many were in
"essential occupations").
133. United States v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 803 F. Supp. 761, 792 n.20 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
134. Id. at 788.
135. Id. at 786. Strong words such as these evoked a strong response from Carey, which may give a
good capsule summary of the IBT's reaction to what Carey saw as the government encroachment involved
in the proceeding described in Part II, supra: "Any time I object to them.., expanding their control, the
first thing they say is 'You're covering up corruption."' he said. Victor, supra note 5.
136. To be sure, the absence of an extensive literature on internal union ethics may actually be
indicative of something good, not bad. Perhaps the reason there is so little written on the subject is that
most unions are honest. In government, ethics laws, independent counsel laws, etc. seem most frequently
to come into being after a "scandal" of some sort has just occurred. The absence of such "laws" and
procedures inside the labor movement may therefore only be indicative only of a general absence of labor
union "scandal." If so, the real story here would be how well the Landrum-Griffin Act works. See
Goldberg, supra note 10, at 1005, 906 n.19 (citing federal organized crime commission report finding only
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individual American unions, internal union ethics rules and ethics enforcement
procedures--devices and procedures directed specifically at the problem of
possible internal corruption-are the exception rather than the rule. At the
national level, union ethics has been on labor's organizational backburner for
more than thirty years. It is ironic that this across-the-board neglect of internal
ethics issues by American organized labor appears, at least in part, to have its
roots in the legislative circumstances surrounding the 1959 passage of the
Landrum-Griffin Act, 137 a major piece of "labor reform" legislation, normally
understood to have had as its central purpose the goal of specifically insuring
honest and ethical unions.
As it was ultimately enacted, the Landrum-Griffin Act was premised upon
the questionable notion that "union democracy"-open access to the ballot box,
honest vote counts, and the like--could serve as a cure-all for labor's internal
ethical shortcomings, by allowing rank-and-file members to clean house for
themselves simply by electing different officers. 38 Experience in other
realms of course suggests that whether democracy alone can ever reliably
produce such a pleasant outcome is open to considerable doubt: in our general
public life, democratically elected government officials are now going to jail
in record numbers for their ethical transgressions, 139 and neither a Bill of
Rights nor honest elections seems to guarantee honest behavior once
individuals assume office. But some seldom-revisited labor history from the
300-400 locals, in a universe of 70,000, to be tied to organized crime).
On the other hand, the absence of such rules or of any accompanying literature also may indicate that
nothing is really being done to ensure that unions are honest. According to one of the few scholars to have
previously considered the relationship between union codes of ethics and the Landrum-Griffin Act, the
"Landrum-Griffin experience does not... adequately indicate the abuses that still take place in unions that
have little or no tradition of idealism or of genuine internal democracy." Kenneth Fiester, How Labor
Unions View and Use Codes of Ethics, in THE ETHICAL BASIS OF ECONOMIC FREEDOM 233, 244 (Ivan Hill
ed., 1976) (emphasis added).
137. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1988).
138. Id. In addition to a definitional and jurisdictional introduction, the Act includes seven subchapters.
The most salient are Subchapter II, §§ 411-15, the "Bill of Rights of Members of Labor Organizations,"
which assures free and equal voting rights, as well as freedom of speech; Subehapter III, §§ 431-41,
"Reporting By Labor Organizations, Officers, and Employees of Labor Organizations and Employers,"
which requires the adoption of union constitutions and bylaws, the keeping of certain financial records, and
the filing of regular financial reports with the Department of Labor, Subchapter IV, §§ 461-66,
"Trusteeships," which allows subordinate union bodies to be put under the operating control of superior
bodies in instances of (among other things) "corruption" and also allows the Secretary of Labor to initiate
a federal district court action to put a union or one of its bodies under the trusteeship of the court;
Subehapter V, §§ 481-83, "Elections," which requires periodic, secret ballot elections; Subchapter VI, §§
501-04, "Safeguards for Labor Organizations," which establishes a fiduciary relationship between a union's
officials and the organization and its members, and forbids Communists and persons convicted of a variety
of violent, extortionate, and embezzlement-style crimes from holding union office; and Subchapter VII, §§
521-31, "Miscellaneous Provisions," which gives the Secretary of Labor authority to investigate possible
violations of the Act and criminalizes the use or threat of force for the purpose of interfering with rights
recognized under the Act.
139. See Elder Witt, Is Government Full of Crooks or Are We Just Better at Finding Them?, in
ESSENTIALS OF GOVERNMENT ETHICS 343 (Peter Madsen-& Jay M. Shafritz eds., 1990) (documenting
recent upsurge in prosecutions of elected officials for corruption in office). But see GEORGE v. PLUNKITT,
PLUNKITT OF TAMMANY HALL 43 (William L. Riordon ed., 1905) (politicians of 1905 no more corrupt than
politicians of 1835).
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end of the 1950's also suggests that passage of the optimistically conceived
Landrum-Griffin Act may actually have aborted what had looked like a nascent
interest on the part of the AFL-CIO in union ethical self-policing. To say
"looked like" here, however, is to use some carefully chosen words, for even
this unusual, high-profile flirtation with "internal union ethics" by the higher
reaches of organized labor may have arisen as much from strategic legislative
maneuvering as from a sincere desire to ensure honest unions.
The evidence for this unflattering conclusion lies in the Act's now largely
forgotten political history, and more specifically in Congress' wavering
exploration, following the McClellan Hearings, 14° of various ways of
ensuring American workers honest unions. One obvious way would have been
to establish a legal requirement that all unions set up internal self-policing
mechanisms. Early drafts of late 1950's anti-corruption legislation therefore
included a requirement that unions proclaim and enforce their own codes of
ethics.141 But, by then, big labor already had begun making a crafty move.
While these predecessor bills to Landrum-Griffin were being developed, the
AFL-CIO took preemptive action. It issued episodically, from 1955 to 1957,
a vague and diffuse, multipoint Code of Ethical Practices for American labor
unions, drafted by then-AFL-CIO General Counsel (and future Supreme Court
justice) Arthur J. Goldberg. 142 The Code served two strategic purposes, both
useful in the effort to avoid government-imposed monitoring requirements.
First, it disarmed congressional proponents of legislatively mandated ethics
rules by suggesting that big labor would take on this job itself. Second, it
provided a basis for drawing a sharp public distinction between the AFL-CIO
and the most notoriously corrupt union in the country. The promulgation of the
Code provided the AFL-CIO with the means to expel the Hoffa-era Teamsters
(who had been the McClellan Committee corruption-fighters' highly-publicized
Exhibit A) from the national organization, for it was known in advance that the
Teamsters would be unwilling to adopt or abide by any such code. 43 With
140. See generally MCCLELLAN COMMrITEE REPORT, supra note 6.
141. Then-Senator John F. Kennedy, a member of the McClellan Committee and the brother of Hoffa-
busting Robert, introduced labor reform legislation in both the 85th and 86th Congresses with a title
dedicated to these codes. S. 3974, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958); S. 1555, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959). See
Richman, supra note 57, at 154 n.57. (discussing the 1959 bill). See generally R. ALTON LEE, EISENHOVER
& LANDRUM-GRIFFIN: A STUDY IN LABOR-MANAGEMENT POLITICS (1990).
142. Robert W. Bennett et al., In Memoriam: Arthur Goldberg, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 807, 824 (1990);
see Obituary of Arthur Goldberg, DAILY TELEGRAPH, Jan. 22, 1990, at 19 (code of ethics led to Teamster
expulsion from AFL-CIO). A slightly kinder view of these codes, as well as a slightly more generous
interpretation of their origin, is given in Fiester, supra note 136, at 233-53. Like this Essay, Fiester links
the promulgation of the codes to the McClellan Hearings and the Landrum-Griffin Act, and he states that
"[w]hether these AFL-CIO actions would have been rigorously enforced against any future misdeeds by
affiliates will never be known for sure," id., thereby apparently conceding that, in the aftermath of
Landrum-Griffin, they in fact have not been.
143. See Bennett, supra note 142, at 824, accord John Schwartz, et al., Breaking the Teamsters,
NEWSWEEK, June 22, 1987, at 43; Obituary of Arthur Goldberg, supra note 142, see also LABOR-
MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE Acr OF 1959, S. REP. NO. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 23
(1959) [hereinafter SENATE REPORT] (discussing Act's purpose to instill ethics in labor unions). For a more
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this self-initiated Code in place, and with the Teamsters formally declared to
be labor movement outlaws, the labor establishment was better positioned to
argue that an ethics-oriented legislative mandate was unnecessary. By the time
Landrum-Griffin was passed, its provisions mandating the enforcement of
union ethics codes had been deleted'44 and were replaced by an exclusive
reliance upon rank-and-file activism through the ballot box as a means of
keeping unions honest. A union members' Bill of Rights was seen as adequate
to serve the function of the previous substantive guarantees.145 Although the
AFL-CIO was still not entirely happy with the end result,146 the previous
direct focus on the ethics monitoring responsibilities of a union's incumbent
officers had been removed. 147 That big labor's interest in its Code may not
have been sincere or profound is observable in what followed: having fulfilled
its primary purpose of defeating externally imposed ethical monitoring
provisions, the AFL-CIO Code of Ethical Practices promptly fell into utter and
complete oblivion. Thirty years later, just as the government was filing its
historic Teamsters RICO suit, the AFL-CIO openly told a federal court that big
labor considered its own Code to be defunct. 4 ' By 1990, the Code was even
out of print,149 having been cited during its entire life in only one reported
federal case.' 50
Moreover, incumbent labor leaders came to enjoy, if not to claim, a greater
victory for union autonomy (and especially for the autonomy of high-level
union incumbents) as Landrum-Griffin began to be enforced. Because the Act
placed responsibility for enforcing its free-speech-and-fair-elections rules in the
complete version of the IBT's expulsion from the AFL-CIO, see JOHN HUTCHINSON, THE IMPERFECT
UNION: A HISTORY OF CORRUPTION IN AMERICAN TRADE UNIONS 333-41 (1970).
144. A bill containing the statutorily imposed ethics code was adopted by the Senate, but the House
passed a bill without a code. Compare S. 1555, 86th Cong, 1st Sess. (1959), reprinted in NLRB,
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1959 516
(1959) [hereinafter NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY] and SENATE REPORT, supra note 143 (considering Title
IV of S. 1555 on "Codes of Ethical Practices") with H.R. 8342, 86th Cong., Ist Sess. (1959), reprinted in
NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra, at 619 and CONFERENCE REPORT ON LABOR-MANAGEMENT
REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT, H.R. REP. No. 1147, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959) (showing that Senate
ethics code provisions disappeared in conference from what became Landrum-Griffin).
145. See Richman, supra note 141, at 154 n.57.
146. According to Fiester, "The AFL-CIO endorsed the Landrum-Griffin standards of union democracy
and financial integrity, but bitterly opposed the scope of the bonding provisions and the extensive paper
work required of even the smallest local union." Fiester, supra note 136, at 242.
147. That Congress was aware of these AFL-CIO Codes is clear beyond a doubt. They were entered
into the Congressional Record, in their entirety, three times from 1957 to 1959. 103 CONG. REC. 7996,
9990 (1957); 105 CONG. REC. 17859 (1959). Statements and testimony by Arthur J. Goldberg and George
Meany, the President of the AFL-CIO, were also offered. 105 CONG. REC. 7425 (1959) (testimony of
Arthur J. Goldberg); 105 CONG. REC. 14645 (1959) (excerpts from testimony of President George Meany).
148. Goldberg, supra note 10, at 982 n.478 (discussing United States v. Local 30, Tile and
Composition Roofers Ass'n, 686 F. Supp 1139 (E.D. Pa. 1988), aff'd, 871 F.2d 401 (3d Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 953 (1989)).
149. Bennett, supra note 142, at 824.
150. United States v. Ford, 632 F.2d 1354, 1377 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 934 (1981)
(holding admission of AFL-CIO Code of Ethical Practices into evidence in pension fund corruption case
involving International Laborers Union not an abuse of discretion).
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hands of the Secretary of Labor, it happily relieved incumbent union leaders
of the politically problematic task of investigating, disciplining, and displacing
their in-house constituents and allies. The potentially expansive Title V
fiduciary relationship provisions of the Act, which theoretically could have
served as a basis for reading broad substantive anticorruption guarantees back
into it, have been underutilized when it comes to serving that purpose, and
have generally not been interpreted to apply to such thorny areas as cronyism
and nepotism. 5' Finally, as the Bill of Rights and election-oriented
provisions of the Act were themselves construed, the rule gradually came to
be established that the interpretation of the unions' own constitutions was to
be entrusted to the incumbent union officers themselves. 52 Not only were
rank-and-file union dissidents thus left largely to the incumbent leaders'
mercies when it came to campaigns and elections, but interpretation and
enforcement of the vague anti-corruption provisions contained in most union
constitutions were left wholly in those leaders' hands as well. 53 For all its
radical reform potential, Landrum-Griffin in the end only marginally disturbed
the long-recognized "iron law of oligarchy" in union management, even in the
Landrum-Griffin-regulated area of union elections.154 And it affected such
arguably unregulated areas as ensuring ethical behavior on the part of
incumbent union officers even less.
Even considered as an historical artifact, the AFL-CIO Code of Ethical
Practices leaves much to be desired as a model for self-directed union reform.
For one thing, the Code has no enforcement provision: the AFL-CIO required
that its constituent unions "comply with the provisions of these codes
promptly."' 55 Although some formal enforcement activity did coincide with
the Code's adoption, 56 the Code actually says nothing about whether
151. 29 U.S.C. §§ 501-04 (1988). See Quinn v. DiGiulian, 739 F.2d 637, 653 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(summarizing cases taking a "broad view" of § 501, which themselves all deal with "official" union duties).
But see Morrisey v. Curran, 482 F. Supp. 31 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (excessive travel reimbursement); Richardson
v. Tyler, 309 F Supp. 1020 (N.D. II1. 1970) (holding that "self dealing" may bring otherwise unredressable
behavior within the scope of § 501). See Stewart J. Schwab, Union Raids, Union Democracy, and the
Market For Union Control, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 367, 369 (The results of attempting to use this section
to control non-financial corruption have been "haphazard.")
152. Woodell v. IBEW, Local 71, 112 S. Ct. 494 (1991); NLRB v. IBE, Local 340, 481 U.S. 573
(1987); Pattern Makers League v. NLRB, 473 U.S. 95 (1985). See Alan Hyde, Democracy in Collective
Bargaining, 93 YALE LJ. 793 (1984) (courts do not enforce union constitutions); Summers, Democracy,
supra note 10 (reviewing limitations of Landrum-Griffin as device for effectively establishing real
"democracy" inside unions). But see 29 U.S.C. § 431(a)(5) (requiring unions to have constitutions and
bylaws and to report to Labor Department on provisions relative to union discipline); 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(5)
(establishing minimum of procedural protections that must be offered in disciplinary cases).
153. See Richman, supra note 141, at 148.
154. See Roger C. Hartley, The Framework of Democracy in Union Government, 32 CAmH. U. L. REv.
13, 62-92 (1982); Summers, Democracy, supra note 10.
155. George Meany, Foreword, in AFL-CIO, AFL-CIO CODES OF ETHICAL PRACTICES, PUB. No. 50,
at 4 (1958) [hereinafter AFL-CIO CODES].
156. Ambiguous excerpts from a 1956 Executive Council Resolution authorized an AFL-CIO
Committee on Ethical Practices to conduct various investigations and hearings, but the remedies available
for misfeasance were nowhere spelled out. See Meany, Forward, id. at 4. Beginning in 1956, an AFL-CIO
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compliance was intended to mean more than formal adoption. Moreover, as a
piece of drafting, the so-called "code" does little honor to that name. It is a
strange and rambling forty-eight page document full of speeches, vague
denunciations of crooks, Communists, and fascists, and wild variations in the
degree of specificity with which it describes the various offenses it purports
to forbid.'57 It contains six basic items, covering matters from "local union
charters"'' 58 to "Union Democratic Processes,"'5 9 but to call the format
inaccessible is gravely to understate the case. Full of references to what
"should be" standard union practice, 6 ' the Code outlaws having
"compromising personal ties" and being irresponsible.' 6' The few specific
practices that it does unequivocally declare to be unethical (for example, taking
"'kickbacks' and under-the-table payments"162 ) are unlikely to add much to
a modem reform-minded union leader's intuitive sense of what should be
considered right or wrong. Although the AFL-CIO Code probably does at least
nod toward most of the essential points that a truly meaningful code would
cover, its precatory tone and flowery high-mindedness convey on every page
that this document was not intended to establish a genuinely enforceable guide
to proper ethical behavior by incumbent union officers.
Since the Code's promulgation-and almost instantaneous eclipse-the
labor movement's silence concerning union ethics has been deafening, with but
a single, notable exception. That exception is the Public Review Board
established thirty-five years ago by the United Auto Workers (UAW), a union
as famous for its integrity as the Teamsters have been for their corruption.' 63
The UAW Public Review Board, composed of prominent, non-labor-movement
citizens, has jurisdiction over complaints brought by union members against
their own power structure, and it appears to have been the model for the
Committee on Ethical Practices investigated about half a dozen allegedly corrupt unions, including the 1BT,
for their failure to meet the AFL-CIO's standards governing ethical union practices. The Committee ceased
conducting such inquiries in 1958, however, about the time that the Landrum-Griffin Act assumed its final
form. HUTCHINSON, supra note 143, at 288-341.
157. Id. at 5. In fairness, it should be noted that the Code's author, Justice Goldberg, did not share
this view. He saw the Code as setting "high standards for unions and union officials," and believed "that
the adoption of these codes by the AFL-CIO constitutes a most significant step in protecting the rights of
union members to clean unions." ARTHUR J. GOLDBERG, THE DEFENSES OF FREEDOM: THE PUBLIC PAPERS
OF ARTHUR J. GOLDBERG 176-77 (Daniel P. Moynihan ed., 1966).
158. AFL-CIO CODES, supra note 155, at 16.
159. Id. at 44. In between are provisions concerning "Health and Welfare Funds" (item II),
"Racketeers, Crooks, Communists and Fascists" (item III), "Investments and Business Interests of Union
Officials" (item IV), and "Financial Practices and Proprietary Activities of Unions" (item V). There is also
a "Supplemental Code" addressing "Minimum Accounting and Financial Controls." Id. at 40.
160. E.g., "A charter should never be issued or permitted to continue in effect for a 'paper local' not
existing or functioning as a genuine local union of employees." Id.
161. Id. at 23.
162. Id. at 33.
163. Frank Swoboda, UAW Reform Movement Stands Next in Line for Union Change, WASH. POST,
Dec. 29, 1991, at H2 ("Unlike the Teamsters, corruption is not an issue within the UAW, long viewed as
one the nation's cleanest unions," and pointing out that economic decline alone may sometimes be enough
to spark grass-roots union reform movements).
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proposed IBT Ethical Practices Committee disallowed by the Independent
Administrator in 1991.164 But even this singular exception to the labor
movement's pervasive "ethical anemia" may be more theoretical than real.
Although the UAW Public Review Board has jurisdiction over "ethical"
complaints, under a brief, four-provision UAW Ethical Practices Code adopted
by the union in 1970,165 in practice only about one in twenty of the
membership complaints that the Board has received and reviewed were filed
pursuant to the UAW Ethical Practices Code. 6 6 The vast majority have
concerned instead union election and free speech-related disputes of a standard
Landrum-Griffin type. The allegedly wrongful withdrawal of a particular
individual grievance-a prototypical "duty of fair representation"
complaint' 67-has been by far the most common matter to come before the
Board. 68 In practice, if not in theory, therefore, even this unique exception
to labor's general lack of concern for ethical self-policing provides limited
practical guidance to a contemporary regime-change reform leader.
164. For a description of the origins and mandate of the UAW Public Review Board, as well as a
listing of the small number of other unions that have adopted similar review bodies, see Jerome H. Brooks,
Impartial Public Review of Internal Union Disputes: Experiment in Democratic Self-Discipline, 22 OHIO
ST. L.J. 64, 84-95 (1961), which describes the operations of the Board in considerable detail. Another early
study is JACK STIEBER ET AL., DEMOCRACY AND PUBLIC REVIEW: AN ANALYSIS OF THE UAW PUBLIC
REVIEW BOARD (1960). Walter E. Oberer's contribution to this study raises a number of issues particularly
relevant to the current IBT situation, including the Board's lack of clear, justiciable standards for reviewing
member complaints due to a vague constitution, and the possible adverse impact of the review process on
the union's "fighting mission" against more powerful employers. Walter E. Oberer, Union Democracy and
Rule of Law, in STIEBER, supra, at 38-39, 41-42. According to a leading historian of union corruption, only
three other American unions had shown an active interest in the idea of public review as of 1970.
HUTCHINSON, supra note 143, at 378. Apparently, some members of a fourth union also once tried (but
failed) to have a similar public review mechanism established. Goldberg, supra note 10, at 924,
n.98.According to Professor Goldberg, these other boards have generally garnered "mixed reviews" at best.
Id.
165. The UAW Code is shorter, more definitive, and more accessible than that of the AFL-CIO. It
prohibits, inter alia, making loans from pension funds to officers and members, the receipt of fees or
salaries from health or welfare funds, and any and all personal financial conflicts of interest. It also outlaws
the use of third parties (i.e., friends, associates, and family members, to whom, for example, the title to
property could be transferred) as a subterfuge for violation of its rules. It further mandates use of "the best
accounting practices" in keeping union books, regular and periodic audits, and the use of competitive
bidding for all proprietary or bookkeeping functions of the union and its subdivisions. UAW, UAW
ETHICAL PRACTICES CODE (1989).
166. Based upon a personal review of the UAW's Public Review Board's Annual Reports, from 1959
to 1990. Kenneth Fiester has also noted that the UAW's decision to go further than the AFL-CIO Codes
in assuring ethical conduct is a great exception within the field, as well as the general under-utilization of
the UAW's Public Review Board by the UAW's members. Fiester, supra note 136, at 240-42.
167. See Clayton v. United Auto. Workers, 451 U.S. 679 (1981) (district courts have discretion
regarding whether members must exhaust their union's own remedies before bringing such a suit); Vaca
v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967) (upholding right of member, under NLRA, to sue union for failure to take
grievance to arbitration).
168. A review of these complaints reveals that the allegations they contain break down into roughly
the following categories: grievances, "First Amendment" issues (speech and union newspaper), membership
(failure to attend meetings, etc.), procedure (e.g., jurisdiction of the Board), mismanagement (e.g., term of
office rules and financial irregularity), and a large variety of election-related issues (such as irregularities
in vote counting, access to voter lists, multiple voting, use of union resources for campaign purposes,
irregularities in the printing of ballots, eligibility for office rules, and the rights of retired or laid-off
members to vote). See author's personal review, supra note 166.
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In micro as in macro, the existence of Landrum-Griffin seems to have
effectively preempted any effort by the labor movement to define ethical and
unethical behavior, and any search for an effective means of ensuring ethical
behavior on the part of union officers. In the UAW members' thinking, as in
the AFL-CIO's politics, what is already illegal is also deemed unethical.
Within the bounds of what is legal, however, everything else is, if not
permitted, at least formally unchallenged within the union, and left to the
Department of Labor or the electoral processes of general union "democracy"
to correct. In an honest union like the UAW, democracy may really work to
keep a union clean. But if this is so, the UAW experience says little that is
useful to a reform-oriented leader confronted by an historically corrupt union
that is very newly reform-oriented-and, so far, reform-oriented only at the
very top. Moreover, an alternative analysis of the UAW Public Review
Board's relative "ethical" inactivity suggests that in the union context, as
elsewhere, what is formally codified into "law" may eventually serve to define
and establish the reigning normative categories for all those concerned. 69 A
statutory focus on the processes of union democracy may eventually come to
mean that it is everyone's-and therefore no one's-job to concern themselves
with actually keeping the unions clean. And this may well be a worldview that
is accepted, for different reasons and through different routes, by rank-and-file
membership and labor union leadership alike.
For Carey and his "New Teamsters," this worldview presents both a
temptation and a challenge. Even a reform-oriented General President might
well be tempted to use the resented Independent Review Board to serve the
same purpose for the "New Teamsters" as the Department of Labor's
Landrum-Griffin oversight responsibilities do for the labor movement
generally. Indeed, one particularly experienced and astute observer has already
noted that the IRB represents a device that might be used by Carey as a
politically helpful scapegoat, to take the real responsibility-and the internal
political heat-for cleaning up the Teamsters off his hands. 170
Giving in to this temptation would have costs when it comes to building
a new culture of democracy, however, or any widely shared sense of honesty,
or of a new internal rule of law within the Teamsters. In the absence of an
aggressive, internally directed clean-up campaign conducted by the New
169. This common social dialectic is well illustrated in Robert M. Cover, The Folktales of Justice:
Tales of Jurisdiction, 14 CAP. U. L. REV. 179 (1985), as well as in the (modem) loci classici, DOUGLAS
HAY ET AL., ALBION'S FATAL TREE: CRIME AND SOCIETY IN EIGHTEENTH CENTURY ENGLAND (1975) and
E.P. THOMPSON, WHIGS AND HUNTERS (1975). It has been applied specifically to American labor law in,
inter alia, Dianne Avery, Images of Violence in Labor Jurisprudence: The Regulation of Picketing and
Boycotts, 1894-1921, 37 BUFF. L. REV. 1 (1989) and Karl E. Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the
Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern Legal Consciousness, 1937-1941, 62 MINN. L. REV. 265 (1978).
See generally JAMES B. ATLESON, VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAw (1983); WILLIAM
E. FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT (1991).
170. See Benson, supra note 100, at 4.
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Teamsters themselves, the very idea of union ethics runs the risk of becoming
resented, just as the current "outsider" enforcer of union ethics seems to be
resented. Carey's challenge is instead to move vigorously against remaining
Teamsters corruption in a manner calculated to create simultaneously a culture
of democracy and a sense of internal rule of law for the union as a whole, and
in a way that will outlast what could still turn out to be Carey's shaky,
temporary grasp on union power.
IV. THE FUTURE OF TEAMSTERS "CORRUPTION"
Throughout the Teamsters litigation, the question of what shall constitute
"corruption" in the Teamsters has been answered more in practice than in
theory. Although the government's complaint focused on "racketeering" and
the La Cosa Nostra connection, the activities of the Investigations Officer
under the consent decree's first phase actually ranged more widely. Allegations
concerning embezzlement of a more personal sort, and of other more "routine"
forms of misbehavior, became a basis for disciplinary action.1 The mandate
of the IRB, the Administrator's second-phase successor, is almost limitless.
The mandate is to attack not just the influence of La Cosa Nostra, but to
eliminate any corruption, indeed to rectify and punish "any action that might
bring reproach upon" the union. 72 The IBT constitution, from which this
mandate is derived, takes this same general-and very vague-approach. What
the IBT's constitution outlaws is simply corrupt activities, but it does not
otherwise define "corruption."
173
In the absence of effective guidance from the IBT constitution or from the
remainder of the labor movement, the Carey administration has chosen to
proceed, initially at least, by establishing ethics structures and procedures
rather than ethics rules. Carey had his Ethical Practices Committee (EPC) up
and running by the fall of 1992. Although Carey has suggested on various
occasions that an ethics code or compliance manual may eventually be
forthcoming, 74 in the short run it appears that the New Teamsters' sense of
what constitutes an unethical practice will evolve in a case-by-case common
law manner, just as the Independent Administrator's did. Obviously, in the
absence of a formal code, the seriousness of the New Teamsters' commitment
171. Cf. United States v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 803 F. Supp. 734 (S.D.N.Y. 1992)
(allegation of embezzlement); United States v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 787 F. Supp. 345 (S.D.N.Y
1992) (charge of physical assault), see also United States v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 782 F. Supp.
256, 260 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (alleged physical assault said to "bring reproach" upon the union); United States
v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 765 F Supp. 1206 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (allegedly nepotistic award of
printing contract as basis for RICO-style "racketeering" charge).
172. IBT Const. art. II, § 2(a); see United States v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 803 F Supp. at
802; Consent Decree, supra note 13, at 20.
173. IBT Const. art. XIX, § 7.
174. Carey, Remarks, supra note 41, at 12.
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to eradicating corruption will be subject to meaningful evaluation only after
these all-important substantive definitions have been developed and given
meaning through their application-and once it has been seen just how
vigorous and aggressive that process of application really is.
There is at least real potential for substantial, on-the-ground ethical
improvement through the EPC. At least the EPC has teeth: the Committee's
rules and procedures provide for the imposition of sanctions ranging from
orders to perform community service to permanent expulsion from the
union.' 75  Moreover, the judicial deference to incumbent officers'
interpretations of union constitutions, which has so long operated to suppress
dissent and insulate those leaders, 176 may now be turned on its head. Given
not just general Landrum-Griffin principles, but the specific history of this
case, it is extremely doubtful that those held to have violated the EPC's and
General President's conception of "corruption" will have any meaningful
opportunity to have such internal union findings overturned in court.'"
With a public review board outlawed by the Administrator,'78 and with
the remaining corruption problems widely conceded to be locally based,' 79
Carey has chosen to proceed in a decentralized "in-house" manner, at least for
175. Rules and Procedures, Ethical Practices Committee, International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
§ 7(b) (Oct. 30, 1992) (on file with author) [hereinafter "EPC Rules and Procedures"]. Additional potential
sanctions include censure, reprimands, fines, restitution orders, suspension, and temporary and lifetime bars
from holding union office. Id. The "community service" provision is limited to orders to provide such
service "to the International union or its subdivisions." Id. An "unreasonable" failure or refusal to cooperate
with an EPC investigation is one offense against the IBT constitution that is now specifically defined. Id.
at § 5(e)(iii) ("Investigative Powers: Members' Duty to Cooperate"). But see infra text accompanying note
190 (General President not bound by EPC "recommendations" regarding imposition of sanctions). It should
also be noted that the IBT constitution already establishes a set of internal union complaint procedures to
handle a number of different issues. IBT Const. art. XIX. These procedures start at the level of locals, and
gradually work up through the established "chain of command," that is, through all of the incumbent-
controlled layers of the union where the remaining ethical problems are thought to be. As noted, the EPC,
in contrast, operates based upon a special power granted to the General President to consider allegations
having to do specifically with corruption.
176. See supra text accompanying notes 151-53. See Richman, supra note 141, at 166.
177. See supra text accompanying notes 151-53 (discussing decisions under Landrum-Griffin deferring
to incumbent union officers' construction of union constitutions). Given the court's past criticism of Carey's
ethics efforts as "pathetic," supra text accompanying note 135, the possibility that it will routinely reverse
his individual decisions to impose sanctions does not seem great. See also Lesly, supra note 83 (finding
95% of expulsions sought by investigations officer upheld by court). Moreover, early in the litigation, the
court supervising the consent decree issued a decision, pursuant to the All Writs Act, consolidating all IBT-
related disciplinary matters with the case before it. United States v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 728
F Supp. 1032, 1050 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), aff'd, 907 F.2d 277 (2d Cir. 1990). Even the Second Circuit has
noted the extreme hostility of this district court to claimants seeking to establish that they are not deserving
of severe sanctions for charges arising from alleged IBT-related misconduct. See United States v.
International Bhd. of Teamsters, 899 F2d. 143, 149 (2d Cir. 1990) (overturning district court-imposed
conditional contempt citation as abuse of discretion); United States v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 978
F.2d. 68 (2d Cir. 1992) (chastising district judge for unilaterally increasing penalties suggested by
Independent Administrator-from five-year suspension to lifetime bar-without adequate respect for
"notions of individual justice and fair play" and based solely upon court's own "fixed view that it should
'throw the rascals out').
178. See supra text accompanying notes 97-99.
179. See supra note 48.
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purposes of initial adjudications. The sixteen-member EPC will function in
Circuit-like three-member panels, with each panel having initial jurisdiction
over one of the IBT's five Area Conferences. 80 Each panel includes an
International Vice President, a local union officer, and-in a substantial
innovation consistent with the larger goal of building a long-term culture of
democracy-a rank-and-file union member.' Prior to appointment in the fall
of 1992, each EPC member was subjected to an extensive personal background
check by an outside personnel security firm, 8 2 and each also has an ongoing
duty to file confidential personal financial disclosure forms with the union's
headquarters.'83 The Committee's staff is to be directed by the EPC's
sixteenth (and nonvoting) member, who assumes the position of EPC
Administrator.' 84 The Administrator conducts investigations and reviews
incoming member-filed complaints, weeding out the frivolous ones and
determining whether any should more appropriately be referred to some non-
EPC Teamsters organ for investigation or action. 8 5 Additional staff is to be
provided to the Administrator as necessary, and the IBT has already arranged
with the personnel security firm that conducted the members' background
investigations to provide additional investigative assistance. 86  The
Committee is to function both by acting upon member-filed complaints and
through Administrator-initiated investigations. 8 7 The Administrator (or
his/her delegate) is guaranteed access to all documents and individuals
necessary to conduct "complete" investigations, and refusal to cooperate with
such investigations is specifically defined as an offense against the union's
constitution by the Committee's rules."' 8
The procedure for imposing sanctions upon a formally charged member
involves three steps. First, a hearing is to be held before the relevant EPC
panel. Where a member has filed the initial complaint, the member prosecutes
the case; the EPC's Administrator prosecutes cases arising from IBT-initiated
180. EPC Rules and Procedures, supra note 175, at § 1(b). The members are to serve without pay, but
will be reimbursed for expenses and lost wages. Id.
181. Id. Of course, whether the rank-and-file member actually will be a significant player in the EPC
panel's deliberations, or instead will just be overwhelmed by the authority of his/her union officer "peers"
and "colleagues," remains to be seen. Cf. Benson, supra note 100 (questioning whether rank-and-file EPC
members will actually behave independently).
182. EPC Rules and Procedures, supra note 175, at § 2(a). The investigations were completed, and
the appointees announced, on October 30, 1992. News Release, International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
Oct. 30, 1992 (on file with author) [hereinafter News Release]. The background investigation was
conducted by a private security investigation firm headed by the former chief of the U.S. Attorney's Office
in the Southern District, Criminal Division. Crowe, supra note 84, at 86.
183. EPC Rules and Procedures, supra note 175, at § 2(b).
184. Id. at § 1(b).
185. Id. at §§ I(d), 5; see also supra note 175 (IBT constitution provides alternate internal complaint
procedure, operating through existing hierarchy).
186. Id. at § l(c), d(ii); News Release, supra note 182.
187. EPC Rules and Procedures, supra note 175, at § 3(a)-(d).
188. Id. at § 5(e).
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investigations.'89 If the panel concludes that the imposition of sanctions is
appropriate following this hearing, it must formally recommend particular
sanctions to the General President in a Final Report, which must be submitted
to the General President (with specific factual findings, and minority and/or
dissenting views, if any) in every case, regardless of whether sanctions are
recommended.' 9 The next step is the General President's written decision
to accept or dismiss the findings and suggested sanctions contained in the
EPC's report, or to impose such other sanctions "as seem fair and just."' 9'
Finally, the Administrator, the complainant, and any person who may be the.
subject of sanctions have a right to appeal a decision by the General President
imposing sanctions to the union's General Executive Board.' 92 The
confidentiality of raw investigative files is strictly protected, 93 but the
General President's and General Executive Board's final decisions, as well as
each panel's Final Report, are open to inspection by any rank-and-file
member.' 94 In order to preserve an unbiased forum, the EPC Administrator
is prohibited (presumably upon pain of being disciplined himself or herself)
from ex parte communication with the General President, General Executive
Board, or other EPC members with respect to particular complaints and/or
investigations. 95
Aside from the possibility that this process will prove to be excessively
cumbersome (how much General President and General Executive Board time
will be consumed reviewing final reports and appeals remains to be seen),9
the most obvious question to be raised concerning the Teamsters' new EPC
concerns its overlapping relationship with the IRB already in place.' 97
Already it has been noted that there is potential for self-defeating competition
189. Id. at § 6. Procedural protections for the accused include access to the investigative record, a
specification of charges, the right to introduce new evidence at the panel hearings, a stenographic transcript,
and the right to be represented at the EPC's hearing by any other union member, as well as "speedy trial"
guidelines for the completion of investigations and hearings. Id. The existence of a right to cross-examine
opposing witnesses appears to have been assumed. The standard of proof is "the preponderance of the
reliable evidence," Id. at § 6(c)(v), the same standard that is applied to NLRB unfair labor practice matters.
29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1988).
190. EPC Rules and Procedures, supra note 175, at § 7(a).
191. Id. at § 8 (a)-(b).
192. Id. at § 8(c).
193. Id. at §§ 4, 6(c)(ii).
194. Id. at § 8(d). The EPC also has a duty to make annual reports and to provide technical assistance
to IBT subsidiaries interested in establishing similar bodies at the local level. Id. at §§ 10, 11.
195. Id. at § 5(c). Exactly how one enforces this requirement, in the event of a general conspiracy to
avoid its terms, is of course a very good question.
196. For discussions of similar administrative problems arising in the context of other institutions'
internal self-policing mechanisms, see Richard J. Terill, Alternative Perceptions of Independence in Civilian
Oversight, 17 J. POLICE SCI. & ADMIN. 77 (1990); Susan Watt, The Future of Civilian Oversight of
Policing, 33 CAN. J. CRIMINOLOGY 347 (1991); Harold Beral & Marcus Sisk, Note, The Administration
of Complaints by Civilians Against the Police, 77 HARv. L. REV. 499 (1963); Margaret A. Lenzi, Note,
Reviewing Civilian Complaints of Police Misconduct-Some Answers and More Questions, 48 TEMP. L.Q.
89 (1975).
197. Cf. Benson, supra note 100 (reviewing and analyzing EPC).
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and rivalry between the two: neither Carey nor the Independent Administrator,
who is now appointed to the Independent Review Board by the Justice
Department, and who might be expected to form an alliance with the third IRB
member he suggested," seems to think that he really needs the other.
1 99
In accordance with the terms of the consent decree, 2°° the IRB's rules permit
that body to refer potential violations against the International to the EPC for
initial action,20' but the IRB retains the authority not only to withdraw a
referred matter from the EPC's jurisdiction (for example, in the event that it
detects reluctance to investigate or prosecute on the part of the Committee),
but also to reverse all EPC decisions. 202 The IRB's rules also penalize any
EPC "failure to cooperate" with the IRB on referred matters, an offense which
includes a failure to proceed upon them in a "timely" manner.2 3 Obviously,
this intensive "oversight of the overseer" provided for in the IRB's rules holds
the substantial, and ironic, potential actually to penalize Carey for having
established the EPC. It not only creates a new type of official malfeasance
arising from cases referred to the EPC, but also diminishes, in such cases, the
opportunity for resorting to the otherwise politically attractive option of
"blaming the IRB" for unpopular disciplinary actions.204 At the same time,
this intensive oversight holds the potential for accomplishing much long-term
good. Precisely by eliminating the opportunity for the EPC to duck hard or
politically unpleasant cases, it could compel the EPC to fulfill its own
potential-and effectively compel all of the New Teamsters, high and low, to
develop meaningful hands-on experience with the internal rule of law.
The second major danger connected with the EPC is that, like most union
disciplinary proceedings,0 5 it could itself become politicized.0 6 Although
this danger is not to be minimized for the long term (and is aggravated by the
absence of an actual "criminal code"), as a practical matter this danger
probably should not generate too much worry for some time. As noted, the
IRB and the court are there to prevent the EPC from running amok by holding
the EPC's feet to the fire with respect to the conduct of its own affairs.
Second, and perhaps more importantly, given the widespread consensus that
much of the lower-level old guard is still in place,20 7 and that the union's
198. See discussion supra Part II.
199. See Benson, supra note 100.
200. Consent Decree, supra note 13, at 20-22.
201. Exhibit A, "Rules and Procedures for Operation of the Independent Review Board for the
International Brotherhood of Teamsters," §§ 1(4) & (5), reprinted in United States v. International Bhd. of
Teamsters, 803 F. Supp. at 761, 803 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) [hereinafter Exhibit A].
202. Exhibit A, supra note 201, at §§ 1(7) & M(I); see also Consent Decree, supra note 13, at 22-23.
203. Exhibit A, supra note 201, at § 1(9).
204. Cf. Benson, supra 100, at 4 (discussing political attractiveness of such a move when alleged
misconduct involves either particularly powerful lower-level leaders or organizational "hot potatoes," which
might result in, inter alia, secession of large locals from International's structure).
205. Id. at 3; Richman, supra note 141.
206. Benson, supra note 100, at 3-4.
207. See Kwik, supra note 48.
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corruption problems are still widespread, °8 the EPC holds relatively little
real-world potential for adding significantly to the risk of individual unfairness
in particular cases, at least not in the short to medium run. If Carey's internal
union "enemies" are also the enemies of clean conduct, as so many aver, then
even a "politicized" EPC would have its hands full investigating and
prosecuting "political" opponents who also happen to be genuinely susceptible
to charges of allegedly having engaged in "corrupt" conduct. Crude as it may
be to say so, even untoward subjective motives on Carey's or the EPC
members' part in the administration of union discipline would probably not
have any untoward objective consequences in the IBT for quite a while. In the
alternative, more optimistic scenario, an internal ethic of integrity and
democratic self-policing may also have an opportunity to take root inside the
Teamsters as the EPC begins its heavily regulated life. And this ethic itself
might also present some defense against politicization of this disciplinary
process in the future.
But to help ensure that the EPC really does achieve its promise and does
not become politicized-and also to help realize larger regime-change
objectives-Carey would do well to promulgate the ethical practices code he
has sometimes mentioned. In order to avoid giving such a code the appearance
of being just an out-of-touch reformist ukase, he could at first apply the code
to his own "top layer," International level staff, over whom he indisputably has
direct control. Alternatively (or in addition), he could issue such a code as an
"interpretation" of the broad anti-corruption mandate accorded to him by the
IBT constitution, making it binding on the union as a whole as an interim
measure. In either event, he could later secure the adoption and ratification of
that code (or something resembling it) by the union's next constitutional
convention, so as to make the code a permanent part of the Teamsters'
institution-wide fundamental law and something that would outlast his own
administration. Not only would the formal adoption of such a code help
institutionalize his own regime change, but it would also help eliminate the
nettlesome due process and "Nuremberg" problems that really do bedevil the
current EPC (and, for that matter, judicial/IRB) arrangement. Considered from
a more Machiavellian perspective, Carey's voluntary promulgation of such a
code--even as a non-constitutionalized "interpretation"-might benefit him
personally, allowing him to profit politically from a salutary "Cincinnatus
effect," for in promulgating such a code he would in effect be voluntarily and
formally limiting his own otherwise largely unfettered discretion. In this
connection, Carey might remember that George Washington has been said to
have entered the regime-change pantheon not for having been the commanding
general in a revolutionary war, nor for having been elected a new regime's
first president, but precisely as a result of the "virtue" that was perceived in
208. See sources cited supra note 48.
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his having voluntarily agreed to relinquish his own potentially unlimited
powers.0 9
Moreover, the process of deciding what such a code should contain
presents the New Teamsters with a unique deliberative "constitutional moment"
that may serve well to raise rank-and-file democratic consciousness by helping
to instill the sense that their beleaguered brotherhood, even during outside
"occupation," still has the capacity to assume at least some responsibility for
redefining itself.210 And such a code might eventually even serve the
independence-minded rank-and-file in another way: as an additional basis for
arguing, someday, that the court and the government may safely withdraw,
more secure that another "democratic" (more accurately, demagogic) Hoffa
will not some day arise.21 "Delivering the economic goods" is not the sole
objective of regime change after all; for a short time anyway, even a Juan
Peron knows how to accomplish that. Destroying--or looting-a democracy
is easier than building one, and institutionalizing a "government of laws and
not of General Presidents" should be a separate, and important, objective for
Carey as well.
Exactly how one defines (or redefines) "corruption" in the drafting of this
code is a separate question. If a durable culture of democracy is eventually to
be built, it is better if that definition is generated from inside the union so that
any opportunity the IBT may have to experience a "republican" or
"constitutional" moment may be fully grasped. Models for drafting such a
definition are available. For all that has been said about it in this Essay, the
AFL-CIO Code does at least touch on most of the right bases. Undoubtedly,
among the topics that any such code would cover are conflicts of interest for
officers and their friends and families; undue self-enrichment; accounting for
and reimbursement of expenses; gifts and gratuities, both from sources outside
the union, and to and from union officials with respect to members; respect for
free speech, election, and association rights; discrimination and sexual
harassment; nepotism and cronyism; and the management of union proprietary
activities. But a sensitivity to context, as well as a love for lofty morals, should
inform exactly what is said. The code should be comprehensive, rigorous, and
detailed, but also simple, clear, and carefully adapted to trade union
209. See GARY WILLS, CINCINNATUS: GEORGE WASHINGTON & THE ENLIGHTENMENT 3 (1984)
(Washington "a virtuoso of resignations" who "perfected the art of getting power by giving it away");
Gordon Wood, The Greatness of George Washington, 68 VA. Q. REV. 189 (1992) (the "greatest act of his
life, the one that made him famous, was his resignation as commander-in-chief" of the Revolutionary Army,
which had "a profound effect everywhere in the Western world").
210. Cf. ACKERMAN, supra note 38 (advocating constitutional conventions in Eastern Europe as way
of consolidating pro-democracy regime change); James G. Pope, Republican Moments: The Role of Direct
Popular Power in the American Constitutional Order, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 287, 366-67 (1990) (discussing
resort to "strong democracy," i.e., large scale popular participation, at times when an entity's "basic
direction" is at issue).
211. Cf. CROWE, supra note 5, at 266 (Carey might pursue a "strategy of undermining [the IRB] by
giving it little to do as the Teamsters cleanse themselves").
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circumstances and legitimate trade union norms. Given resource constraints,
formal and informal enforcement priorities would probably have to be
developed for such a code as well, just as they have developed for criminal
prosecutions generally, and will inevitably develop through the EPC. And for
the same democratic reasons, those too would best be generated from within.
There are, to be sure, risks associated with pursuing this course. Holdover
incumbents are not likely to delight in seeing their old and quiet ways so
publicly and systematically challenged. Enemies will be aroused. At the same
time, the potential benefits of promulgating such a code from-of all unlikely
places-Jimmy Hoffa's former office are also great, and not just for the
Teamsters. As others have noted, during its current, high public-profile
moment, the IBT has at least a temporary opportunity to spark elsewhere in the
labor movement, if not similar regime changes, some marginal reforms in
ethics as in economics.1 2
CONCLUSION
Lenin had some experience with "regime change;" he too ran a "revolution
from above." His purpose was different, to be sure, but his famous question,
slightly rephrased, nonetheless applies: what exactly is likely to be done?
The only honest answer is that it is anybody's guess. Given the federal
court's obvious and powerful determination to carry out its anti-corruption
mandate, whether the remaining corrupt individuals will be removed is the
easiest prediction to make. Whatever difficulty that court may be having in
developing a sensitivity to the regime-change dimension of the task in which
it is engaged, there is no doubt as to its devotion to the more narrowly defined
task of "throwing the rascals out." Therefore, whether the EPC itself
contributes anything substantial to the eradication of corruption in the near
future may not turn out, after all, to be a terribly important question. EPC or
no EPC, code of ethics or no code of ethics, the strong probability is that this
task will eventually be done, and as thoroughly as any court can do it.
Considerably less certain is whether the internally-based EPC, with its
rank-and-file participation and openness to member-initiated complaints, can
assist in the long-term regime-change process by fostering a faith in the
possibility of honest, autonomous unions, and of an honest, democratic
Teamsters union in particular. Where honesty and democracy have been so
long suppressed, instilling faith in this possibility is plainly the necessary first
step toward building a new post-authoritarian culture. A single free and open
election-however happy in result-does not a successful regime change make,
and over the longer run, a successful pro-democracy regime change inevitably
depends for its survival upon the existence of active support for the democratic
212. See Feldman, supra note 30.
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regime from below. If Carey does not create it-through the EPC, a code, or
otherise-his own election may well turn out to be merely another historical
footnote. Whether the EPC will make more than a symbolic contribution to the
building of such a democratic culture remains to be seen. But, in a situation
of fundamental pro-democracy regime change, symbols matter too.
Whether any of this matters is the largest and the most uncertain question
of all. The United Auto Workers' vaunted integrity has not protected that
union's members from a drastic, precipitous loss of jobs, wages, benefits, and
future opportunities. If national and global economic changes mean that
organized labor's social and economic role will continue its precipitous
decline, the current effort to reform the Teamsters may amount to no more
than routine law enforcement-welcome for its own sake, but of little lasting
concern except to those directly involved. On the other hand, if organized labor
were somehow to revive, then reforming and revitalizing this largest union in
the country is a matter of great consequence for everyone-for national
economies here and overseas, for those who work with their hands, and for
those who work in-or just represent-the corporate suite.
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